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Abstract 
 
Objective: The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between hospital 
structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given 
hospital acquired condition (HAC) Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. Structural 
characteristics included hospital type, case mix index, average daily census, bed size, 
ownership, disproportionate share percentage, location, and American Nurses Credentialing 
Center Magnet status. The secondary objective of the study was to determine whether a 
hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to 
quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years. These objectives were achieved 
through retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using 4 publicly available 
data sources. Background: The intention of pay-for-performance programs, including the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid HAC Reduction Program, is to improve the quality of care 
delivered; however, the theoretical and conceptual basis of pay-for-performance programs and 
their efficacy in improving care are widely debated. This study was designed to address the gap 
in knowledge related to the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means of motivating 
providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality. Results: Higher average daily 
census, disproportionate share percentage, and case mix index were associated with increased 
likelihood of receiving a penalty in the HAC Reduction Program. Approximately half (49%) of 
who did not experience a penalty at all improved their Total HAC Score. 51% of hospitals with 1 
year of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 54% of hospitals with 2 years of penalty 
improved their Total HAC Score; 73% of hospitals with 3 years of penalty improved their Total 
HAC Score. Conclusions: Despite the inability of some hospitals to meet the benchmark to 
avoid penalty, the vast majority of hospitals improved their performance over time. This finding 
holds promise for value-based reimbursement as a means for improving HAC incidence. 
Keywords: pay for performance, healthcare associated infections, healthcare quality 
indicators, organization and administration 
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Dissertation Introduction 
The title of this dissertation is, “Hospital Characteristics Associated with HAC Reduction 
Program Payment Penalties across Program Years.” This study will be a secondary data 
analysis using numerous publicly available datasets. A grant proposal will serve as the 
dissertation proposal for Chapters I-III, using the NIH SF424 form for R01 applications as a 
guide for content and page limits. Chapters IV and Chapter V will be Findings and Discussion & 
Conclusions, a manuscript for submission to Quality Management in Healthcare will explore and 
discuss the research findings. Chapter VI will be the Concluding Narrative, with additional 
information on the Results and Discussion due to the page limitation of the manuscript.  
The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between hospital structural 
characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction 
Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's 
penalization status (penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program 
years is related to quality performance (Total HAC Score). In the manuscript, these aims will be 
referred to as “objectives” so that the manuscript is submission-ready. The study findings will 
contribute to a growing body of knowledge surrounding the efficacy of value-based 
reimbursement in quality improvement and measurement. To this end, the study will explore 
how organizational structural characteristics contribute to success and failure in quality 
measures in a well-known, high-stakes, national pay-for-performance program. 
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Specific Aims 
Hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) are a growing issue in healthcare that harms patients 
and leads to the extension or complication of care, increased healthcare costs, disability, and 
even death (Pittet & Donaldson, 2006). The HAC Reduction Program is a budget-neutral 
penalty-only program, existing among several Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) pay-
for-performance structures offering incentives, or upside risk, such as Value-Based Purchasing 
(VBP) and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2017c). The intention of the pay-for-performance programs is to 
improve the quality, and therefore value, of care delivered; however, the theoretical and 
conceptual basis of pay-for-performance programs and the conclusiveness of their efficacy is 
widely debated (de Bruin, Baan, & Struijs, 2011; Eijkenaar, Emmert, Scheppach, & Schöffski, 
2013; Emmert, Eijkenaar, Kemter, Esslinger, & Schöffski, 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson 
et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010). For the HAC Reduction Program the intention is to reduce 
preventable harm to patients (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018). 
In the HAC Reduction Program hospital performance is assessed using both Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) hospital-
acquired infections (HAI). More specifically, the AHRQ Patient Safety Composite measure (PSI-
90) and the CDC/NHSN HAI central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSI), catheter-
associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), surgical site infections (SSI), methicillin-resistant 
staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteremia, and C. difficile laboratory-identified events are used 
to create an overall score.  
Cross-sectional studies have found that some hospital structural characteristics contribute 
substantially to financial penalty in the CMS HAC Reduction Program: hospitals that have 400 
or more beds, are academic, have a level I trauma center, have a higher case mix index (CMI), 
or have safety net status are more frequently penalized (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 
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2015; Soltoff, Koenig, Demehin, Foster, & Vaz, 2018). Additional structural characteristics, 
including DSH percentage, teaching status, Medicare and Medicaid patient volume, nurse 
staffing level, profit status, and Joint Commission accreditation, have demonstrated an inverse 
relationship to performance in both the HAC Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing 
(VBP) (Borah et al., 2012; Fuller, Goldfield, Averill, & Hughes, 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; 
Rajaram et al., 2015). Because not all hospitals required to participate in the HAC Reduction 
Program are scored in every measure due to low volume of patients or procedures (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b), larger hospitals that have higher volumes of qualifying 
patients and procedures and also care for a higher proportion of complex and/or disadvantaged 
populations, disproportionately receive penalty status (Rajaram et al., 2015).  
Although research has been conducted examining hospital characteristics as they relate to 
various CMS pay-for-performance programs within a single program year (Borah et al., 2012; 
Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), there is a gap 
in research related to how hospitals fare in the program year-to-year. Unlike previous cross-
sectional studies (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), this study will 
explore hospital structural characteristics as related to both penalty status and HAC 
performance, across program years. 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between hospital 
structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any 
given HAC Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. The null hypothesis is that there 
is no significant difference in the characteristics of hospitals penalized in the HAC Reduction 
Program in years FY 2015 to FY 2018.  
The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization status (penalized 
or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to quality 
performance (Total HAC Score). The null hypothesis is that there is no significant association 
between Total HAC Score and penalty status across years. This study will use a repeated 
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measures analysis of variance to achieve the aims. The results from this study will inform a 
growing body of knowledge surrounding the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means 
of motivating providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality.  
 Background and Significance 
 This study is guided by Donabedian’s three dimensions of care: structure, process, and 
outcome (Donabedian, 1988), but also informed by the tenets of agency theory, behavioral 
economics, and value theory as these are the theoretical basis for the pay for performance and 
VBP programs. 
Economic and Behavioral Theories Underlying Value-Based Reimbursement 
Agency theory. Value-based reimbursement is based on the economic theory of agency, 
which describes the payment arrangement or relationship between a principal (the patient, for 
example) and an agent (a provider’s organization, for example) (Conrad, 2015). Agency theory 
describes this principal-agent relationship as a “contract” whereby the ideal would involve the 
agent, or provider, delivering the most efficient care possible, delivering quality by using as few 
resources as possible, and maximizing principal (patient) well-being (Dranove & White, 1987). 
Agency theory is supported by behavioral economics, which integrates economic theory with the 
contribution of human factors to healthcare quality (Jack Stevens, 2017).  
Behavioral economics. Behavioral economics shows great potential for integration in 
quality and safety research, as the literature encourages incremental behavioral changes 
realistic for healthcare providers to drive change and make meaningful improvements (Jack 
Stevens, 2017). Himmelstein, Ariely, and Woolhandler state, “while higher pay clearly increases 
performance for straightforward manual tasks such as installing windshields (Lazear, 1996), a 
growing body of evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology indicates that 
rewards sometimes undermine motivation and worsen performance on complex cognitive tasks, 
especially when intrinsic motivation is high” (Himmelstein, Ariely, & Woolhandler, 2014a, p. 
203). Himmelstein et al. (2014a) explain that pay-for-performance operates on the assumption 
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that performance can be accurately ascertained, more detailed contracts will improve quality, 
variation in care is attributed to variation in performance, financial incentives add to motivation, 
and that hospitals or providers not meeting quality standards deserve fewer resources. 
Behavioral economics draws on the work of Skinner (1953), who was a thought leader in the 
science of human behavior and wrote about the effects of reward and punishment on 
individuals’ conduct. Not only did Skinner find that rewards positively reinforced good behavior, 
but he also found punishment important to establishing conditions that would be conducive to 
avoiding a certain behavior (Skinner, 1953). At face value, Skinner’s work (1953) provides 
support for the theory of pay-for-performance in quality programs: if an individual or organization 
is behaving well (delivering standard or above-standard quality of care), they should receive 
additional resources as a reward in order to promote the positive behavior. Similarly, punishing 
hospitals for poor performance by either withholding incentives or issuing financial penalty has 
been thought to condition hospitals to provide better care. Skinner was not an organizational 
theorist, however, and much of his research involved basic human tasks instead of complex 
medical care delivered in dynamic, volatile, healthcare institutions. Therefore, the evidence and 
merit surrounding pay-for-performance as a way of improving healthcare quality is questionable 
(Himmelstein et al., 2014a). 
Value theory. Value theory is very similar to axiology, which concerns itself with the study of 
what things are “good” and to what degree they are good (Shroeder, 2016). Shroeder (2016) 
explains that some, such as philosopher Immanuel Kant, might have held human life as having 
limitless value; however, in more modern perspectives, life has been widely categorized as an 
example of incommensurability of values, meaning no single value can be placed on it 
universally. From this point of view, the value of human life is higher if it is at risk of being taken, 
but lower if the aim is preserving it (Shroeder, 2016).  
Maguire (2016) extrapolates the value theory to a value-based theory of reasons: the weight 
of the reason to perform a certain action hinges upon the value achieved by the outcome. In 
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healthcare, the outcomes of saving a life or improving well-being, are heavily weighted reasons 
for performing an action, and can explain why healthcare providers might be intrinsically 
motivated to make behavioral modifications in order to do such actions. This predicates a vague 
understanding of value in healthcare, how performance can be extrinsically motivated, and how 
healthcare can or should measure the value, or amount of “good” being provided to patients. 
The amount of “good” is synonymous with quality, which healthcare quality trailblazer Avedis 
Donabedian (1966) describes as taking many different forms for different individuals, but 
measured primarily by the outcome of the care delivered. 
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
This study is guided by Donabedian’s three dimensions of care: structure, process, and 
outcome (Donabedian, 1988). Structure accounts for the care setting; process considers the 
actual steps in care administration; and outcome takes into account the effects of the care 
delivered on a patient’s overall health status (Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian introduced that 
economic efficiency, or valuation, be considered in quality improvement and proposed that 
practitioners maximize the cost-benefit of healthcare improvements, as increased cost will not 
always lead to an equal increase in the quality of care (Donabedian, 1966).  
The transition to higher quality and lower costs by holding providers accountable is 
challenged conceptually by issues surrounding provider practices, clinical systems, payment 
models, and managerial systems (Mkanta, Katta, Basireddy, English, & Mejia de Grubb, 2016), 
all of which are examples of structure as defined by Donabedian (1966). Value-based 
reimbursement for hospitals has proliferated ahead of fully developed healthcare system 
structures to accommodate it. For example, the prevalence of fee-for-service and capitation 
models in the healthcare market continues to promote volume over value (Miller, 2009). 
Therefore, some healthcare systems and providers are reluctant to adapt to the team-based 
care required of value-based practices (Mkanta et al., 2016). In addition, there is insufficient 
availability of relevant data that allow for comprehensive monitoring of the quality of care across 
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the continuum. This is a key component of defining value in healthcare (Mkanta et al., 2016). In 
summary, the impact of value-based reimbursement on care, costs, and outcomes remains 
poorly understood (Mkanta et al., 2016); however, structure and outcome are intrinsically linked 
(Donabedian, 1966). 
In the proposed work, structural variables include: hospital type (acute care, critical access, 
children’s), volume of discharges, ownership (proprietary, non-profit, government owned, or 
otherwise), geographical location, and American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC) Magnet 
accreditation status. Processes related to the proposed research will not be measurable using 
publicly reported/available data. While evidence-based infection and complication prevention 
processes will not be investigated in this research, an organization’s structural characteristics 
can be key to implementing strategies for improving processes, and thus patient outcomes such 
as HACs (Donabedian, 1966). This study will examine the relationship between structural 
variables and penalty status in the HAC Reduction Program, then examine the Total HAC Score 
(the summary score of HAC outcomes measures) across program years. This conceptual 
framework is depicted in Figure 1. 
Various hospital structural characteristics have demonstrated significant relationships with 
level of quality measured in both the HAC Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing 
(Borah et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015). The 
infrastructure and resources provided by an organization are key to creating quality and value in 
healthcare (Mkanta et al., 2016); however, pay-for-performance structures are lacking 
conclusive or supportive evidence as tools for meaningful and sustainable quality improvements 
(de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; 
Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010). In this study, associations will be explored 
between structural characteristics that may influence processes, which in turn, could impact 
quality care outcomes as measured in the CMS HAC Reduction Program.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the proposed research. 
 
Note. DSH = Disproporationate share; ANCC = American Nurses Credentialing Center; HAI = Hospital Acquired Condition; CAUTI = 
Catheter-associated urinary tract infection; CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; 
MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus; PSI = Patient Safety Indicator. 
Scientific Premise & Background 
The patient safety implications, contribution to inpatient morbidity and mortality, and financial 
burden of HACs have long been recognized. HACs have reduced considerably over the past ten 
years through various programs and efforts by various federal agencies, such as those by the 
Department of Health and Human Services, AHRQ, and the CDC (Bysshe et al., 2017). Despite 
having made significant progress, HACs continue to be costly both financially and to human 
quality of life, and the inclusion of HACs in the transition from fee-for-service to value-based 
reimbursement has further increased interest in accurately measuring, quantifying, and reducing 
HACs (Bysshe et al., 2017). Section 3008 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) established the 
CMS HAC Reduction Program beginning with FY 2015 hospital discharges (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016a). The program was developed with the intention of 
• Hospital Characteristics:
• Hospital type
• Case mix index
• Admission Volume
• Bed Size
• Ownership
• DSH Adjustment
• Location
• ANCC Magnet® Designation
Structure
• Adherence to best practices for HAC 
preventionProcess
• Penalty Status (Yes/No)
• Total HAC Score:
• CAUTI in ICU and Select Wards
• CLABSI in ICU and Select Wards
• SSI Colorectal Surgery
• SSI Hysterectomy
• C. Difficile
• MRSA
• PSI-90
Outcome
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reducing preventable infections and complications, which include both AHRQ PSIs and CDC 
NHSN HAIs. 
Evidence suggests that structural characteristics of hospitals influence penalty status in the 
CMS HAC Reduction Program (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018). 
Not all hospitals required to participate in the HAC Reduction Program are scored in every 
measure due to low volume of patients or procedures (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2017b). This contributes to disproportionate penalty of larger hospitals that have 
higher volumes of qualifying patients and procedures. These financial penalties may harm the 
economic health of larger hospitals, which are also the hospitals that care for a higher 
proportion of complex and/or disadvantaged populations (Rajaram et al., 2015). Thus penalties 
may add to the high financial burden of caring for poor communities, and even threaten 
hospitals’ ability to survive and continue to provide access to disadvantaged populations (Fos, 
2017). Healthcare disparities and access to care for low-income patients could be worsened as 
a result of penalties in pay-for-performance structures (Fos, 2017). It is noteworthy that while 
HACs included in the HAC Reduction Program are risk adjusted, they are not adjusted for 
socioeconomic status (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017; Dudeck, Aponte, 
Arcement, & Patel, 2017; McIlvennan, Eapen, & Allen, 2015). 
HAC Reduction Program Methodology 
HAC Reduction Program scores are determined for each hospital based on risk-adjusted 
performance, which is then compared to national performance, in two domains. Domain 1 is 
worth 15% of the Total HAC Score and is comprised of PSI-90 only; Domain 2 is worth 85% of 
the Total HAC Score and is comprised of six NHSN indicators: CAUTI and CLABSI for ICUs and 
select wards (medical and/or surgical units) and SSI associated with hysterectomy and 
colorectal surgery (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). While NHSN 
mandates surveillance on many different HAIs, this subset was selected for public reporting in 
the CMS Inpatient Quality Reporting Program and, subsequently, the HAC Reduction Program 
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(CDC, n.d.). Program methodology is further described in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2. HAC Reduction Program Scoring Methodology (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2017b).  
Note. PSI = Patient Safety Indicator; HAI = Hospital Acquired Infection; CAUTI = Catheter-associated urinary tract infection; CLABSI 
= Central line-associated bloodstream infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus; 
CDI = C. Difficile Infection; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition. 
 
Hospitals in the HAC Reduction Program are assigned a Total HAC Score, as well as 
Winsorized z-scores for each measure. Higher Total HAC Scores indicate poor overall HAC 
performance. Based on performance across all individual HAC measures, the lowest quartile of 
Total HAC Score performance is the threshold above/below which a hospital is penalized 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). The HAC Reduction Program requires 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to penalize hospitals that are in the lowest quartile 
of national performance. Hospitals with a Total HAC Score that is greater than the threshold are 
subject to payment reduction. Thresholds vary year-to-year based on overall nationwide 
performance. Incentives are not provided to hospitals that have Total HAC Scores above the 
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lowest quartile. Measures in both domains follow AHRQ and NHSN standard specifications, 
respectively. HAIs are represented and scored using the risk-adjusted standardized infection 
ratio (SIR) for each measure in the HAC Reduction Program (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2017b).  
Domain 1 is comprised of Version 6.0.2 of the PSI-90 Patient Safety Composite (15% of 
program performance), which contains a total of 10 PSI measures, the components of which are 
detailed in Figure 3 (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016b). These PSIs provide 
information on potential in hospital complications and adverse events following surgeries, 
procedures, and childbirth (AHRQ, n.d.). PSIs entail very complex specifications, as they are 
derived completely from administrative data and are therefore a classification of International 
Classification of Disease (ICD-9 and ICD10) codes into medical conditions. PSIs are intended to 
“identify potential adverse events that might need further study; provide the opportunity to 
assess the incidence of adverse events and in hospital complications using administrative data 
found in the typical discharge record; include indicators for complications occurring in hospital 
that may represent patient safety events; and indicators also have area level analogs designed 
to detect patient safety events on a regional level” (AHRQ, n.d.). 
NHSN specifications are used in the HAC Reduction Program to identify cases eligible for 
reporting and scoring in Domain 2 (85% of program performance). CAUTI, CLABSI, MRSA, SSI, 
and C. difficile are all HACs surveilled through NHSN. A summary of NHSN specifications for 
each measure can be found in Appendix A.  
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Figure 3. Changes to the PSI-90 Safety Composite Metric in detail (Fontana & Hawes, 2017).  
Note. PSI = Patient Safety Indicator. CRBSI = catheter-related bloodstream infection; PE = pulmonary embolism; DVT = deep vein 
thrombosis. 
 
Measurement error. Both PSIs and HAIs are clearly defined, but are still subject to 
occasional methodological updates. While this sometimes benefits patients, providers, and 
consumers (risk adjustment updates that better capture the complexity and risk factors of the 
population, for example), it can create confusion and lack consistency desired for comparing 
performance year-to-year. Although this is a consideration, the hospitals included in the HAC 
Reduction Program equally potentially influenced by similar challenges; hence, further 
investigation is needed to determine how methodological changes in measurement and scoring 
impact hospital penalty status. 
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While many agree that measuring the incidence and impact of HACs is a worthy cause, 
HAC measurement has been scrutinized in its current form since it was introduced as a key 
component of pay-for-performance (Bysshe et al., 2017). The inclusion of HAC measures in 
both VBP and the HAC Reduction Program to-date is intended to emphasize the importance 
reducing preventable negative outcomes that impact the quality of life for patients; however, the 
validity of HACs as performance measures has been controversial (Calderon, Kavanagh, & 
Rice, 2015; Fuller et al., 2017; Winters et al., 2016). Variability in HAI surveillance practices 
(Rau, 2016), for example, hospitals with a robust infection surveillance program will count more 
infections, and therefore unfairly penalizing them for identifying more infections compared to 
hospitals with less robust programs (Rau, 2016), and the sole reliance of PSIs on administrative 
data (Bysshe et al., 2017) are central to HAC measurement controversy. Issues of poor 
methodological reliability can lead to the inaccurate designation of a hospital as a poor 
performer, which, in turn, results in financial penalty for hospitals that are not poor performers 
(Soltoff et al., 2018).  
Finally, over the years the HAC Reduction Program has been in place, outcome measures 
have seen numerous modifications: for example, CAUTI and CLABSI both changed from 
reporting only SIR to infections identified in ICUs and select wards in FY 2018 (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). Likewise, PSI-90 saw major changes in FY 2018 
(Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016b) shifting from version 5.0.1 to 6.0.1 in 
2017, meaning that the measurement of outcomes in the HAC Reduction Program lacks 
consistency across years. These changes are detailed in Figure 3. The changes include 
additions, removals, and re-specification of several PSIs which pose an overwhelming challenge 
for hospitals who wish to reduce infections and avoid financial penalty.  
In addition, HACs lack sensitivity and precision in the measurement of nursing practice, as 
they capture only a small portion of nursing care and dismiss fundamental components of the 
doctrine of profession of nursing, such as symptom management (Jones, 2016). Therefore, 
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measurement error is an important consideration to the interpretation of HAC Reduction 
Program scoring and public reporting. 
Importance and Improvements to Current Knowledge 
The most widely recognized and mandated pay-for-performance programs are the CMS 
hospital pay-for-performance which includes VBP and the Hospital Readmission Reduction 
Program (HRRP), and MACRA and the Merit-Based Incentive Program (MIPS) which 
incentivize physicians (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017c). However, private 
payors and hospital systems are now including similar arrangements in individual hospital and 
provider contracts (Atkinson, Masiulis, Felgner, & Schumacher, 2010; Caveney, 2016). Thus, it 
is important to understand if the pay-for-performance programs are effective. Despite increasing 
adoption by payors, one meta-analysis and systematic review found the benefits of pay-for-
performance programs to be “modest” to performance improvement and focused 
disproportionately on process measures instead of outcomes (Ogundeji, Bland, & Sheldon, 
2016). Outcome measures reflect the effects of the care delivered on overall health status, such 
as mortality, readmissions, and infection rates (Donabedian, 1966). While outcomes are of 
superior importance in the realm of quality measurement, structure and process measures are 
important in understanding the conditions of care (Donabedian, 1966). Structure and process 
are unmistakably related, however, the relationships between process and outcome, and 
between structure and both process and outcome, are not as clear (Donabedian, 1966). This 
study will focus on performance as related to outcomes (HACs) and explore their relationship 
with structure. 
Previous research suggests that structural characteristics of hospitals contribute to being 
penalized or not in the HAC Reduction Program (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015). 
Hospitals that are large (400 or more beds), academic, have a level I trauma center, or who 
have a higher CMI are more often subject to penalty (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015). 
Also more frequently penalized are hospitals with safety net status, meaning that the 
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organization is part of the highest quartile of disproportionate share (DSH) payments awarded to 
large urban hospitals that care for a high proportion of uninsured patients (Rajaram et al., 2015). 
Safety-net hospitals are defined as being in the top quartile of DSH patient percentage and 
Medicare uncompensated care (UCC) payments per bed are at a greater risk for financial 
penalty in both VBP and the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, as well (Gilman et al., 
2015). Hospitals performing in the worst quartile are subject to a 1% penalty in reimbursement 
for that fiscal/payment year. This can translate to well over a million dollars for a high-revenue 
hospital (Rau, 2016). Penalties can be particularly impactful for safety-net hospitals, as some 
already operate at low margins and cumulative losses could become detrimental over time, 
particularly if losses result in eventual closure (Gilman et al., 2015). Even for small, low-volume 
hospitals, closure can restrict access to care for the community affected. 
Although previous research has shown hospital characteristics are related to being 
penalized by various CMS pay-for-performance programs within a single program year (Borah 
et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), 
there has been no exploration on how hospitals fare year-to-year. By characterizing the effects 
of the HAC Reduction program over time, our results can inform decisions by healthcare policy 
stakeholders, such as the general public, policy makers, and technical experts who serve as 
advisors to CMS and AHRQ. Although healthcare providers and members of the general public 
are often familiar with other, more publicized components of the ACA such as medical insurance 
coverage, findings from this study will assist stakeholders in making knowledgeable advocacy 
and policy. Advocacy may include participation in CMS public comment opportunities regarding 
elements of the ACA affecting hospitals, patients, and healthcare quality standards. This study 
intends to provide valuable insight into the role of pay-for performance structures in incentivizing 
healthcare quality improvement, which can be leveraged to influence policy makers (Penuel & 
Means, 2013). In addition, this study will contribute to the practice of nurse leaders and 
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administrators by exploring how nurse-sensitive structural characteristics, such as Magnet 
accreditation, contribute to HAC performance.  
 Innovation  
This study is innovative in that it compares performance in the HAC Reduction Program 
within and across multiple program years. While research has been conducted with regard to 
hospital characteristics (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), measure 
validity (Winters et al., 2016), and program reliability (Soltoff et al., 2018) in CMS pay-for-
performance programs, studies have so far only been conducted within the same program year, 
limiting applicability and the ability to make inferences regarding impact to hospitals and patient 
outcomes over time. In addition, the current study’s results will contribute to a growing body of 
research on the efficacy and validity of quality measures and pay-for-performance programs 
(Ogundeji et al., 2016), which have found inconclusive or conflicting evidentiary support in 
improving care in a meaningful and sustainable way (de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 
2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010). 
This study is well-suited for an AHRQ-sponsored National Research Service Award (NRSA) 
Individual Postdoctoral Fellowship (F32) grant, PA-17-481, as it aligns with AHRQ’s mission of 
making health care safer, higher quality, more accessible, equitable and affordable for all. 
Approach 
Study Design 
The proposed research is a descriptive study involving retrospective, longitudinal 
multivariate regression analysis using multiple publicly available datasets. The primary aim of 
this study is to examine the relationship between hospital structural characteristics and 
penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction Program year, FY 
2015 through 2018. The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization status 
(penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to 
quality performance (Total HAC Score). Although secondary, retrospective analysis may pose 
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methodological concerns associated with procedures used in the primary analysis: i.e. bias, 
representativeness, missing data from the primary source, and issues with data linkage (Clarke 
& Cossette, 2000; Harron et al., 2017), it is the only means of ascertaining CMS pay-for-
performance program performance.  
Sample. The sample will include hospitals that were in the CMS HAC Reduction Program 
from FY 2015 to FY 2018 for which complete data are available. Any hospital participating in the 
Inpatient Prospective Payment System/Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System 
is initially qualified for inclusion in the HAC Reduction Program. Approximately 3,233 hospitals 
will meet these criteria based on initial query of data files necessary for the analysis of the 
primary and secondary aims. Hospitals with incomplete data in any one of the three datasets 
(Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program file, Hospital Compare Hospital General 
Information file, and CMS Payment Update Impact File) will be omitted. For the primary aim, a 
sample size of 3,233 is sufficient to examine hospital structural characteristics associated with 
HAC Reduction Program payment penalty. Since the sample size of interest is large and power 
is not expected to be an issue (James Stevens, 2002), positive power analysis will be done after 
the analysis of the primary and secondary aims to determine power based on the sample and 
effect size observed. 
Data Sources. Three publicly available data sets will be used in the study. They are the (1) 
the Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program file, (2) the Hospital Compare Hospital General 
Information file, and (3) the CMS Payment Update Impact File. Both Hospital Compare datasets 
are publicly available via the Data.Medicare.gov website Data Archive. The CMS Payment 
Update Impact File is also available publicly in multiple formats through the National Bureau of 
Economic Research for FY 1986 to most recent FY (Roth, 2017). In addition, a fourth dataset 
will be derived via manual data entry from the ANCC Magnet “Find a Facility” website tool 
(American Nurses Credentialing Center, 2018). Data for all eligible hospitals will be extracted 
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and linked across datasets using hospital CMS Certification Numbers (CCN) to create a single 
dataset.  
Procedures. In order to begin analysis for the primary and secondary aims, a single dataset 
must be constructed with all necessary variables. First, the Hospital Compare HAC Reduction 
Program dataset will be used to assess eligible hospital performance across HAC measures 
and in the overall program. The binary variable for HAC Reduction Penalty Status is readily 
available in Hospital Compare files for FY 2017 and 2018, but will require calculation for FY 
2015 and 2016 based on Total HAC Score falling above or below the lowest quartile of 
performance for all eligible hospitals (above the lowest quartile indicates status of “no”, below 
indicates “yes”). The HAC Reduction Program’s list of participating hospitals for each included 
FY will be combined with the CMS Payment Update Impact File and Hospital General 
Information files for the corresponding time period using each hospital’s CCN as the unique 
identifier. Hospitals included in the HAC Reduction Program, but not included in the CMS 
Payment Update Impact File and/or Hospital Compare Hospital General Information file will be 
omitted. Hospitals not accredited as Magnet will be retained in the sample, as accreditation will 
be used as a descriptive variable. Magnet accreditation status data will require name and 
address to be used to link hospitals into the overall dataset, as CCN is not readily available from 
the ANCC Magnet website and must be manually matched using Hospital Compare and 
American Hospital Association datasets. Binary variables will be created indicating Magnet 
designation status for each of the HAC Reduction Program years researched (2015-2018). 
The study does not require IRB review, as it does not fall within the regulatory definition of 
research involving human subjects as defined by 45 CFR 46.102. The proposed study utilizes 
only publicly available data sets, and do not contain any patient information. 
Variables 
Variables for primary aim. Table 1 lists the variables for the study. The dependent variable 
for this analysis is penalty status for any one program year, FY 2015 through 2018. HAC 
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Reduction Program Penalty Status is a binary variable (yes/no) within the Hospital Compare 
HAC Reduction Program file, which will be used to indicate whether penalty was issued by CMS 
to an individual hospital in any program year. Hospital structural characteristics that are 
expected to be related to penalty status are outlined in Table 1. Hospital type is described by 
CMS as: acute care, children’s, or critical access. A hospital's CMI represents the average 
diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight for that hospital, which is calculated by summing 
the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of discharges; higher 
CMI indicates more complex and resource-intensive caseloads (U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, 2018). Admission volume is measured by the average daily census, which 
captures the mean number of individuals hospitalized as inpatients; bed size is the number of 
licensed beds. Ownership describes who owns the hospital, whether it is owned by the 
government (federal, state, local, or hospital district or authority), physicians, is proprietary, 
tribal, or voluntary non-profit (church, other, or private) (Roth, 2017).  
DSH adjustment is reported as the Disproportionate Share Hospital Patient Percentage 
(DPP) as determined from most recent update of the Provider Specific File (PSF) & Social 
Security Administration data (Roth, 2017). Hospitals are determined as qualifying for DSH 
payments by a formula or by demonstrating that more than 30 percent of their total net inpatient 
care revenues come from State and local governments for indigent care not including Medicare 
or Medicaid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017a). Location has two descriptive 
variables: Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) designation (urban or rural; large or other) and 
region (New England, Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central, 
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific, Puerto Rico). ANCC Magnet 
designation will be included as an indicator of hospital commitment to nursing excellence, as 
Magnet-recognized hospitals are considered to retain superior nursing talent and exhibit better 
patient outcomes (American Nurses Association, n.d.). Many HACs are viewed as nurse-
sensitive outcomes; therefore, a hospital structural measure such as Magnet status, which is 
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indicative of quality nursing care, is necessary to evaluate the effect of the nursing care on 
outcomes such as HAC performance (Jones, 2016). Variables included in the primary aim, 
including concepts, variables, operational definitions, sources, and dataset variable names to be 
used in analysis are described in Table 1. A binary variable will be constructed to indicate 
whether a given hospital had been penalized in any other program year, using a SAS IF-THEN 
statement across the included program years (if Payment_Reduction= ‘yes’ then 
Penalty_In_Other_Year= ‘1’). This calculated variable will then be used as an 
independent/predictor variable along with hospital characteristic variables. 
Variables for secondary aim. Total HAC Score will be used to measure whether a hospital 
has improved its performance across program years. Described further in Figure 2, Domain 1 
(PSI-90) is worth 15% of the Total HAC Score, whereas Domain 2 (HAI) is worth 85%. Not all 
hospitals are scored in both domains or for every measure depending on patient or procedural 
volumes, as detailed in Figure 2. In such events, the Total HAC Score will be based exclusively 
on the hospital’s Domain 1, or PSI-90 score, as applicable (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, 2017b). 
Of note, for FY 2015 through 2017, Winsorization was not used for the calculation of the 
Total HAC Score. Instead, hospitals’ Total HAC Scores were determined points assigned by 
relative rank/performance decile only (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017d). 
This methodology is further described in Appendix B. Winsorization is a statistical procedure 
that involves ranking hospitals on a spectrum from best to worst performing and, “if a hospital’s 
measure result falls between the minimum and 5th percentile, CMS sets the hospital’s measure 
result equal to the 5th percentile”; “if a hospital’s measure result falls between the 95th 
percentile and maximum, CMS sets the hospital’s measure results equal to the 95th percentile” 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). This process is performed to reduce the 
effects of extremely high or low measure results (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2017d). Therefore, hospitals cannot directly compare measure scores, the two domain scores, 
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and Total HAC Scores between FY 2018 and any previous program years (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). Thus, FY 18 will not be included in these analyses for 
aim 2. 
Although measure specification and definition changes within PSIs and HAIs across 
program years and therefore pose challenges with in consistent measurement of HAC 
performance over time, the methodology for the calculation of Total HAC Score remained 
consistent from program years 2015 to 2017. In light of this, the Total HAC Score will be used to 
measure performance improvement or decline over program years for FY 2015 to FY 2017.  
Table 1. Variables, operational definitions, sources, and variable names for analysis. 
Variable 
 
Operational Definition Source 
Dataset 
Variable 
Name 
Independent Variables for Primary Aim (FY 2015-2018) 
Hospital type Hospital description as acute care, children’s, or critical access by 
CMS. 
Hospital Compare 
Hospital General 
Information file 
Hospital 
Type  
 
Case mix index Average DRG relative weight for each hospital, calculated by 
summing the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and 
dividing by the number of discharges and paid under Hospital 
Specific Payment rate (Roth, 2017). 
CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
CMIV 
Admission Volume Average daily patient census. CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
Average 
Daily 
Census 
Bed Size Number of beds licensed to hospital. CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
BEDS 
Ownership Hospital ownership description: owned by government (federal, 
state, local, or hospital district or authority), physician, proprietary, 
tribal, voluntary non-profit (church, other, or private). 
Hospital Compare 
Hospital General 
Information file 
Hospital 
Ownership 
DSH Adjustment DSH Patient Percentage as determined from most recent update 
of the Provider Specific File & Social Security Administration Data 
(Roth, 2017). 
CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
DSHPCT 
Location 1. CMS Core Based Statistical Area designation 
categorized by CMS as urban or rural, large, or other.  
2. Region categorized as New England, Middle Atlantic, 
South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central, 
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, 
Pacific, or Puerto Rico. 
CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
REGION, 
URGEO 
ANCC Magnet Status Yes/No, binary variable related to whether the hospital is 
accredited with Magnet status for each HAC Reduction Program 
year (2015-2018). 
ANCC n/a 
Dependent Variable for Primary Aim (FY 2015-2018) /  
Independent Variable for Secondary Aim (FY 2015-2017) 
HAC Reduction 
Program Status 
Yes/No, binary variable related to whether penalty was issued by 
CMS.  
Hospital Compare 
HAC Reduction 
Program file  
Payment_ 
Reduction 
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Penalty in Any Other 
Program Year 
(Covariate) 
Yes/No covariate binary variable constructed to indicate whether a 
given hospital had been penalized in any other program year (if 
Payment_Reduction= ‘yes’ then Penalty_In_Other_Year= ‘1’). 
Calculated 
Penalty_In
_Other_Ye
ar 
Dependent Variable for Secondary Aim (FY 2015-2017) 
Total HAC Score Total HAC Score based on hospitals’ performance on 6 quality 
measures: PSI-90 and NHSN CLABSI, CAUTI, SSI for Colon 
Surgery and Abdominal Hysterectomy, MRSA bacteremia, and 
Clostridium difficile infection measures. Hospitals with a Total HAC 
Score greater than the 75th percentile of the Total HAC Score 
distribution are subject to a payment reduction (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). 
Hospital Compare 
HAC Reduction 
Program file 
Total_HAC
_Score 
 
Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CMI = Case Mix Index; DRG = diagnosis-related group; DSH = 
Disproportionate Share; ANCC = American Nurses Credentialing Center; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition; PSI = Patient Safety 
Indicator; NHSN = National Health and Safety Network; CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheter-
associated urinary tract infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus. 
Data Analysis and Management Plan 
Analytical model selection. For the primary aim, an analytical approach allowing for 
multiple independent variables (structural characteristics) and a single, binary dependent 
variable (penalty status) was necessary (Kim & Mallory, 2016). The approach must also control 
for the covariate of penalty status in any other program year and allow for repeated 
measurement of independent and dependent variables for each program year studied (FY 
2015-2018). Thus, repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was selected as the 
analytical method for the primary aim. 
The secondary aim requires an approach appropriate for evaluating the relationship 
between a single binary independent variable (hospital penalty status) and a continuous 
dependent variable (Total HAC Score) over time (program years FY 2015 to 2017) (Kim & 
Mallory, 2016). A one-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used for 
the secondary aim. SAS software will be used for statistical tests in both aims.  
Primary Aim: The primary aim of this study is to examine the relationship between 
hospital structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in 
any given HAC Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. 
 Analysis plan for primary aim. A binary logistic regression with repeated measures 
ANCOVA will be used to test for a relationship between each hospital characteristic 
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(independent variable) and HAC Reduction Program penalty status (dependent variable) for 
each program year (2015-2018). In order to assess the relationship between and across these 
variables and HAC Reduction Program penalty status, structural variables will be used in a 
univariate, then multivariate model. For the multivariate model, the model statement will be 
modified to model categorical outcomes with fixed effects and repeated measures, using the 
SAS GLIMMIX procedure to account for repeated measurement of the independent and 
dependent variables for each program year (Schabenberger, 2005). Univariate testing will be 
performed for any variables determined to be confounding in the multivariate model. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the characteristics of 
hospitals penalized in the HAC Reduction program from program years FY 2015 to FY 2018, 
which will be tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association among 
hospital characteristics across all program years. If the p-value is less than the assumed 
significance level of α = 0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the alternative. 
Descriptive statistics including calculating means, standard deviations, and ranges for the 
continuous variables, and counts with frequencies for categorical variables will be used to 
describe the characteristics of the sample. Frequencies, proportions, and 95% confidence 
intervals will also be used for each categorical group. Data will be assumed normal and 
homoscedasticity will be checked graphically. Multicollinearity will be addressed using backward 
elimination if any variable is found to have a significant effect on the outcome (penalty status).  
Secondary Aim: The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization 
status (penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is 
related to quality performance (Total HAC Score). 
Analysis plan for secondary aim. ANOVA will be used to evaluate the relationship 
between hospital penalty (independent variable) and change in Total HAC Score (dependent 
variable) across program years FY 2015 to 2017. Descriptive statistics will be used to describe 
the sample, including calculating means, standard deviations, and ranges for the continuous 
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variables, and counts with frequencies for categorical variables. Frequencies, proportions, and 
95% confidence intervals will also be used for each categorical group.  
The null hypothesis for the secondary aim states there is no significant association between 
Total HAC Score and penalty status across program years (2015-2017), which will be tested 
against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association among hospital characteristics 
across years. If the p-value is less than the assumed significance level of α = 0.05, our null 
hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the alternative. Data will be assumed normal and 
homoscedasticity will be checked graphically. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations in this study, which include the use of secondary data 
described previously (Clarke & Cossette, 2000), methodological issues with the original (CMS, 
AHRQ, and NHSN) measurements and scoring, elapsed time since the primary data collection 
and analysis, and missing data for some hospitals. Methodological changes across program 
years in the HAC Reduction Program do not provide for optimal comparison of program results 
over time. This could pose the threat of measurement bias (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady, 
& Newman, 2013). An additional methodological change is to the PSI-90 Patient Safety 
Composite, in which three measures were added and one was removed; weightings of three 
PSI measures were also increased, shifting weight from other measures within the composite 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b), and underwent an update in risk 
adjustment, or “rebaseline” of the SIR in 2017 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2018b). Finally, data collection and surveillance procedures related to HAI measures has also 
been suspected to influence hospital performance (Rau, 2016). 
These numerous changes to and challenges with the HAC Reduction Program methodology 
apply to all hospitals, giving no one hospital an unfair advantage. In addition, CMS endorses the 
comparison of measure scores, domain scores, and Total HAC Scores across all program 
years, with the exception of 2018 when the Winsorization scoring method was adopted (Centers 
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for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). Therefore, the proposed study intends to use the 
measures and program methodology as they exist during the program years studied, to achieve 
the primary and secondary aims. The researchers acknowledge that the proposed research 
assumes validity of each HAC metric in measuring hospital performance, although it has been 
controversial (Calderon et al., 2015; Fuller et al., 2017; Winters et al., 2016). 
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Appendix A 
NHSN HAI Specifications 
CLABSI, CAUTI, MRSA, and C. difficile are captured by NHSN by “date of event” (DOE), 
which is the date the first element used to meet an NHSN site-specific infection criterion occurs 
for the first time within the seven-day infection window period (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2018a, pp. 2–7). SSI is captured by the date of the procedure by which the infection 
originated. 
A CAUTI is a urinary tract infection in which an indwelling urinary catheter had been in place 
for >2 days and was either present for any portion of the calendar day on the DOE or the 
catheter was removed the day before the DOE. The patient must also have had at least one of 
the following signs or symptoms: fever (>38.0°C), suprapubic tenderness, costovertebral angle 
pain or tenderness, urinary urgency, urinary frequency, or dysuria (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2018a). In addition, the patient must have had a urine culture with no more than 
two species of organisms identified, at least one of which is a bacterium of ≥105 colony forming 
units/ml (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a, pp. 7–5). 
NHSN defines CLABSI as a laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infection where an eligible 
bloodstream infection (BSI) organism is identified and an eligible central line is present on the 
laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infection date of event or the day before (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2018a). Central lines eligible for inclusion been in place for more than 
two consecutive calendar days following the first access of the central line, in an inpatient 
location, during the admission included in the program (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2018a). Lines are eligible for CLABSI events and remain eligible for CLABSI events 
until the day after removal from the body or patient discharge, whichever occurs first. An eligible 
organism for inclusion is one that meets the criteria for a laboratory-confirmed bloodstream 
infection in NHSN (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a, pp. 4–6). 
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Procedures eligible for SSI surveillance for colon surgery or hysterectomy are defined by 
ICD-10 or CPT codes designated for inclusion by NHSN. Procedures require incision of the skin 
or mucous membrane and must take place in an operating room (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2018a). Infections included as SSI for colon surgery and hysterectomy must 
occur within 30 after the procedure and involve a part of the body, as the HAC Reduction 
Program includes only deep incisional and organ/space SSI, which is monitored for a longer 
time period than superficial incisional SSI. To qualify as an SSI, the patient must have purulent 
drainage, a deep incision that spontaneously dehisces or is intentionally opened or aspirated, 
test positive for an organism, and must have had either fever (>38.0°C) or localized tenderness 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a, pp. 9–10). 
MRSA surveillance includes staphylococcus aureus cultured from any specimen that tests 
oxacillin-resistant, cefoxitin-resistant, or methicillin-resistant by standard susceptibility testing 
methods, or by a laboratory test for MRSA detection from isolated colonies. C. difficile requires 
a positive test for the organism. Both MRSA and C. difficile monitored at the overall facility-wide 
level for inpatient areas (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018a). 
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Appendix B 
FY 2015, 2016, and 2017 HAC Reduction Program Scoring Methodology (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, n.d.). 
 
 
Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition; SSI = Surgical site infection; 
CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheter-associated urinary tract infection. 
 
 
 
FY 2015, 2016, and 2017 Scoring Methodology 
 
The domain weights and measures for FY 2017 were the same as FY 2018. However, in FY 2016, CMS 
included only SSI, CLABSI, and CAUTI in Domain 2 and Domain 2 received a weight of 75 percent in the 
Total HAC Score. In FY 2015, CMS included only CLABSI and CAUTI in Domain 2 and Domain 2 received 
a weight of 65 percent. 
In FY 2015, FY 2016, and FY 2017, CMS calculated measure results for each measure for which a 
hospital has sufficient data. A performance decile* was then assigned for each measure based on the 
hospital’s measure result. For each hospital for each measure, CMS assigned a measure score between 1 
and 10 based on the decile in which the hospital’s measure result fell. For hospitals with a non-zero 
measure result for a given measure, CMS assigned x points to hospitals that fell within the xth 
performance decile, ranging from a minimum of 1 point assigned to hospitals in the first performance 
decile (best-performing hospitals) to a maximum of 10 points assigned to hospitals in the tenth 
performance decile (worst-performing hospitals)*. Higher scores indicated worse performance. 
 
Refer to the FY 2017 HAC Reduction Program HSR User Guide (PDF-1.2 MB) for more information on the 
scoring methodology used for the FY 2017 HAC Reduction Program. 
* Hospitals received the minimum of one point for measures with a measure result of zero (vol. 79, FR 28140-28141) 
regardless of the performance decile. For example, for the CAUTI measure, if 13 percent of hospitals had an SIR of 0, 
one point would be assigned to each of the hospitals and two points would be assigned to the remaining 7 percent of 
hospitals in the second decile because their SIR was larger than 0. 
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Abstract  
Objective: The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between hospital 
structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given 
hospital acquired condition (HAC) Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. Structural 
characteristics included hospital type, case mix index, average daily census, bed size, 
ownership, disproportionate share percentage, location, and American Nurses Credentialing 
Center Magnet status. The secondary objective of the study was to determine whether a 
hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to 
quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years. These objectives were achieved 
through retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using 4 publicly available 
data sources. Background: The intention of pay-for-performance programs, including the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid HAC Reduction Program, is to improve the quality of care 
delivered; however, the theoretical and conceptual basis of pay-for-performance programs and 
their efficacy in improving care are widely debated. This study was designed to address the gap 
in knowledge related to the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means of motivating 
providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality. Results: Higher average daily 
census, disproportionate share percentage, and case mix index were associated with increased 
likelihood of receiving a penalty in the HAC Reduction Program. Approximately half (49%) of 
who did not experience a penalty at all improved their Total HAC Score. 51% of hospitals with 1 
year of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 54% of hospitals with 2 years of penalty 
improved their Total HAC Score; 73% of hospitals with 3 years of penalty improved their Total 
HAC Score. Conclusions: Despite the inability of some hospitals to meet the benchmark to 
avoid penalty, the vast majority of hospitals improved their performance over time. This finding 
holds promise for value-based reimbursement as a means for improving HAC incidence. 
Keywords: pay for performance, healthcare associated infections, healthcare quality 
indicators, organization and administration 
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Introduction 
Hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) are an issue in healthcare that harms patients and 
leads to the extension or complication of care, increased healthcare costs, disability, and even 
death (Pittet & Donaldson, 2006). The HAC Reduction Program, implemented in 2014, is a 
budget-neutral penalty-only program, existing among several Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS) pay-for-performance structures offering incentives, such as Value-Based 
Purchasing (VBP) and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017c). It is unclear whether the program functions as 
intended. The intention of all pay-for-performance programs is to improve the quality, and 
therefore value, of care delivered; however, the theoretical and conceptual basis of pay-for-
performance programs and their efficacy is widely debated (de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et 
al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 
2010). The HAC Reduction Program was created to reduce preventable harm to patients 
(Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018). 
In the HAC Reduction Program, hospital performance is assessed using several nurse-
sensitive outcomes measures (Burston, Chaboyer, & Gillespie, 2014), including the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs) and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) hospital-
acquired infections (HAI). More specifically, an overall score is calculated using the AHRQ 
Patient Safety Composite measure (PSI-90) and the CDC/NHSN HAI central line-associated 
bloodstream infections (CLABSI), catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), surgical 
site infections (SSI), methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteremia, and C. 
difficile laboratory-identified events.  
Cross-sectional studies have found that some hospital structural characteristics are related 
to financial penalty in the CMS HAC Reduction Program. Hospitals that are academic medical 
centers, with 400 or more beds, have a level I trauma center, a high case mix index (CMI), 
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and/or safety net status are more frequently penalized (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 
2015; Soltoff et al., 2018). Additional structural characteristics that are associated with poorer 
performance in both the HAC Reduction Program and Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) include 
higher disproportionate share (DSH) percentage, high Medicare and Medicaid patient volume, 
for profit status, teaching status , and Joint Commission accreditation (Borah et al., 2012; Fuller 
et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015). Though American Nurses Credentialing 
Center (ANCC) Magnet accreditation has not been explored as a structural characteristic in 
relation to the HAC Reduction Program specifically, Magnet accreditation has been associated 
with reduced HAC incidence (Barnes, Rearden, & McHugh, 2016; Bergquist-Beringer, Cramer, 
Potter, Stobinski, & Boyle, 2018). 
Because not all hospitals required to participate in the HAC Reduction Program are scored 
in every measure due to low volume of patients or procedures (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2017b), larger hospitals that have higher volumes of qualifying patients and 
procedures and also care for a higher proportion of complex and/or disadvantaged populations, 
disproportionately receive penalty status (Rajaram et al., 2015). The above studies were all 
cross-sectional studies within a single (Borah et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 
2016; Rajaram et al., 2015) or two program years (Soltoff et al., 2018). The aim/purpose of this 
study is to examine how hospitals fare in the HAC reduction program across years. A 
longitudinal design studying multiple program years will precipitate a better understanding of 
inter-hospital variability and changes in quality which may be linked to participation in the 
program (Penuel & Means, 2013), as there is a gap in research related to how hospitals fare in 
the program year-to-year. 
This study will explore associations between structural characteristics that may influence 
processes, which in turn, could impact quality care outcomes as measured in the CMS HAC 
Reduction Program. Processes related to HACs will not be examined in this study. The primary 
aim of this study is to examine the relationship between hospital structural characteristics and 
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penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction Program year, FY 
2015 through 2018. The secondary aim is to determine whether a hospital's penalization status 
(penalized or not penalized) across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to 
quality performance (Total HAC Score). 
The Conceptual Model 
The results from this study inform a growing body of knowledge surrounding the efficacy of 
value-based reimbursement as a means to motivate providers and organizations to improve 
healthcare quality. The study design was guided by Donabedian’s three dimensions of quality : 
structure, process, and outcome (Donabedian, 1988). Structure accounts for the care setting; 
process considers the actual steps in care administration; and outcome takes into account the 
effects of the care delivered on a patient’s overall health status (Donabedian, 1988). 
Donabedian introduced that economic efficiency, or valuation, be considered in quality 
improvement and proposed that practitioners maximize the cost-benefit of healthcare 
improvements, as increased cost will not always lead to an equal increase in the quality of care 
(Donabedian, 1966). An organization’s structural characteristics can be key to implementing 
strategies for improving processes, and thus patient outcomes such as HACs (Donabedian, 
1966). Pay-for-performance programs lack the evidence necessary to produce processes for 
meaningful and sustainable quality improvements (de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; 
Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010).  
Methods 
Study Design 
This is a descriptive study involving retrospective, longitudinal multivariate regression 
analysis using multiple publicly available datasets, three available through CMS and one 
through ANCC. The primary objective is to examine the relationship between hospital structural 
characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) in any given HAC Reduction 
Program year, FY 2015 through 2018. The secondary objective is to determine whether a 
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hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to 
quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years.  
Sample. The sample included hospitals that were in the CMS HAC Reduction Program from 
FY 2015 to FY 2018 for which complete data were available. Any hospital participating in the 
Inpatient Prospective Payment System/Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System 
is qualified for inclusion in the HAC Reduction Program. The initial sample size was 3,233 in the 
primary objective and 3,382 in the secondary objective. Hospitals with incomplete data in any 
one of the three datasets were omitted during data management procedures. 
Data Sources. Three publicly available datasets were used in the study. They are (1) the 
Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program file, (2) the Hospital Compare Hospital General 
Information file, and (3) the CMS Payment Update Impact File. Both Hospital Compare datasets 
were publicly available via the Data.Medicare.gov website Data Archive. The CMS Payment 
Update Impact File is available through the National Bureau of Economic Research for FY 1986 
to most recent FY (Roth, 2017). In addition, a fourth dataset was created manually from the 
ANCC Magnet “Find a Facility” website tool (American Nurses Credentialing Center, 2018). 
Each year’s data for all eligible hospitals were extracted and linked across datasets using 
hospital CMS Certification Numbers (CCN) to create a single dataset. Variables provided by 
each data source are detailed in Appendix A. 
Procedures. A single dataset was constructed with all necessary variables through several 
steps. First, the Hospital Compare HAC Reduction Program dataset was used to extract data for 
HAC measures and in the overall program for eligible hospitals. The binary variable for HAC 
Reduction Penalty Status is already calculated in the in Hospital Compare files for FY 2017 and 
2018, but required calculation for FY 2015 and 2016. Therefore, the binary variable was 
calculated for FY 2015 and 2016 based on Total HAC Score falling above or below the lowest 
quartile of performance for all eligible hospitals (above the lowest quartile indicates status of 
“no”, below indicates “yes”). The third step was to combine the HAC Reduction Program dataset 
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with the CMS Payment Update Impact File and Hospital General Information files for the 
corresponding time period using each hospital’s CCN as the unique identifier. Hospitals 
included in the HAC Reduction Program, but not included in the CMS Payment Update Impact 
File and/or Hospital Compare Hospital General Information file were omitted. Hospitals not 
accredited as Magnet were retained in the sample, as accreditation was used as a descriptive 
variable. In the final step, to obtain the Magnet accreditation status, name and address were 
used from the Magnet data to link hospitals into the overall/combine dataset, as CCN is not 
readily available from the ANCC Magnet website and must be manually matched using Hospital 
Compare and American Hospital Association datasets. Binary variables were created indicating 
Magnet designation status for each of the HAC Reduction Program years researched (2015-
2018).  
Variables. Variables included in the primary and secondary objectives are described in 
Appendix A. The figure includes concepts, variable name, operational definitions, sources, and 
dataset variable names to be used in analysis. Independent variables for the primary objective 
were hospital type, CMI, average daily census, bed size, ownership, DSH adjustment, location, 
and ANCC Magnet Status. The dependent variable for the second objective was constructed to 
indicate whether a given hospital had been penalized the initial program year studied (2015) in 
comparison with the following years (2016-2017) studied. Total HAC Score was used to 
measure whether a hospital has improved its performance. 
 A minor adjustment to the data acquisition plan was necessary during analysis preparation. 
Two versions of CMI were available for each HAC Reduction Program year. For example, in FY 
2015, CMI version 31 and 32 were available and version 32 was used for analysis; for FY 2016, 
version 32 and 33 were available and version 33 was used for analysis, and so on. Different 
versions of CMI are based on the DRG grouper logic us year (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2016b); therefore, it was appropriate to proceed with the analysis by 
comparing CMI versions across years. For the purpose of this study, only the most recent year 
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of CMI available was extracted. Data management completed prior to analysis is detailed in 
Appendix B. 
Analysis Preparation 
Three steps were taken to prepare the data for analysis. First, due to an unanticipated lack 
of variation, the variable for hospital type was removed from the model after determining that all 
hospitals meeting criteria for inclusion in the dataset were categorized as “acute care hospitals.” 
Hospitals with a CMS Certification Number (CCN) available for each of the four years studied in 
the primary objective and all three years studied in the secondary objective were then filtered to 
include those with complete data for the dependent variable (penalty status for objective 1 and 
HAC score for objective 2). Hospitals with no data for penalty status for the primary objective, or 
that lacked 2015 or 2017 performance data necessary to calculate total HAC score for the 
secondary objective, were excluded. For the secondary objective, at least two Total HAC 
Scores are necessary to evaluate a potential difference in Total HAC Score between years. 
Thus, 3,399 hospitals were the sample for the primary objective and 3,382 hospitals were the 
total sample for the secondary objective, as described in Table 1. 
Table 1 
 
Number (n) of Hospitals Included in Each Objective for Each Program Year Studied 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total 
Observations 
Across Years 
Primary Objective      
All Years  3399 3399 3399 3399 13596 
All Years, with Penalty Status Available  3280 3211 3267 3258 13016 
Secondary Objective      
All Years  3382 3382 3382 n/a 10146 
All Years, with Total HAC Score for 2015 & 2017  3204 3204 3204 n/a 9612 
 
In the second step, since multicollinearity was a concern due to the potential relation of 
some structural characteristics, a pairwise comparison of Pearson correlations for non-
categorical variables was performed prior to the analysis for the primary objective. A nearly 
perfect correlation was observed between average daily census and bed size (r= 0.97). 
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Therefore, before proceeding to final model and to check for collinearity, the two variables were 
examined in an ANCOVA model first separately and then together. Using bed size alone in the 
model, average daily census yielded significant results (F= 318.91, p= <.0001) and a negative 
parameter estimate (t= -51.33). Average daily census was also significant if run separately in 
the model (F= 204.62, p= <.0001) with a negative parameter estimate (t= -43.10). Together in 
the model, both remained significant (average daily census F= 42.95, p= <.0001, bed size F= 
10.19, p= 0.0014), but parameter estimates changed substantially (average daily census t= 
6.55; bed size t= -3.19) indicating multicollinearity. Therefore, bed size was excluded from the 
initial model in favor of average daily census, which more accurately describe patient volumes 
rather than facility capacity. No other pairwise Pearson correlations were found to have a 
strong, or even moderate, positive or negative correlation by commonly accepted interpretations 
(r= less than 0.50 or greater than -0.50) (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 2003). A matrix of correlation 
coefficients is presented in Table 2. 
 The third and final step was done in preparation for the examination of the secondary 
objective. A categorical variable was constructed to indicate how many years a given hospital 
had experienced a penalty status of “yes” in the years 2015 through 2017, ranging from values 
0-3; 0 indicating hospitals that had not received any penalty in the years studied, 1 indicating 
one year of penalty, 2 indicating 2 years of penalty, and 3 indicating 3 years of penalty (penalty 
for all included years). A binary variable was then created to indicate whether a given hospital 
had a reduction in Total HAC Score for the time period (1, or “yes,” indicates improvement in 
Total HAC Score from 2015-2017). Because hospitals cannot directly compare measure scores 
after the adoption of Winsorization methodology by CMS, FY 18 results were not included in the 
analyses of Total HAC Score for objective 2. Winsorization and related changes are further 
detailed in Appendix C. 
Results (Chapter IV) 
Results for Primary Objective 
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The number of hospitals qualifying for and included in each objective for each program year 
studied is summarized in Table 1. In each year studied, approximately 2,500 hospitals were 
penalized and approximately 750 hospitals were not (see Tables 3 and 4). Average daily census 
was substantially higher in hospitals receiving penalty (M= 158.16, SD= 170.49) across the 
years studied than those that were not (M= 97.69, SD= 124.33). Similarly, DSH percentage was 
higher for penalized hospitals in all four years (M= 0.32, SD= 0.19) than non-penalized hospitals 
(M= 0.28, SD= 0.17). CMI was also higher for the penalized group across years (M= 1.62, SD= 
0.37) than the group not receiving a penalty (M= 1.53, SD= 0.37). 
Hospitals in the South Atlantic region comprised the highest percentage of penalized 
hospitals across years 2015 to 2018 (18%), followed by Pacific (15%) and Middle Atlantic (15%) 
regions. The majority of hospitals penalized were in the large urban CMS core based statistical 
area (CBSA) category (48%); the next highest percentage CBSA category was other urban 
(34.3%) across years. Non-Magnet-accredited organizations encompassed the overwhelming 
majority of penalized hospitals across years (82-88%). For hospital ownership, privately-owned 
voluntary non-profit organizations made up 45% of all penalized hospitals in the time period 
studied, followed by proprietary-owned hospitals at 18%. 
Next, using the process of backward elimination, hospital structural variables for each year 
were included into a binary logistic regression ANCOVA fixed effects model in order to examine 
the effect of average daily census, ownership, geographical location, and Magnet accreditation 
on penalty status. This initial model yielded significant associations between all the variables 
and penalty status, with the exception of Magnet accreditation status (p= 0.5461) and hospital 
ownership (p= 0.1002) (see Table 5). Therefore, using the process of backward elimination to 
obtain a parsimonious model, Magnet status and hospital ownership were excluded in 
subsequent models. 
The next ANCOVA model indicated the need to eliminate CBSA (p= 0.0681), which 
designates hospitals as large urban, other urban, or rural (see Table 6). Thus, the final 
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multivariate model excluding hospital type, Magnet Status, hospital ownership, and CBSA 
maintained a significant association between penalty and average daily census (F= 88.56, p 
<.0001), DSH percentage (F= 15.82, p <.0001), region, and CMI (F= 13.98, p <.0001). Results 
for the final ANCOVA fixed effects model shown in Table 7 and are reported with greater detail 
in Table 8, including the categories within each hospital characteristic. 
Table 8 
 
Results for Final Fixed Effects Model of Hospital Structural Characteristics, Including Variable 
Categories 
Fixed Effect Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
DF t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -2.2149 0.2011 3346 -11.01 <.0001 
Average Daily Census 0.00228 0.000242 9549 9.41 <.0001 
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage 0.7031 0.1768 9549 3.98 <.0001 
Region      
New England 0.2498 0.1681 9549 1.49 0.1373 
Middle Atlantic 0.1346 0.1232 9549 1.09 0.2747 
South Atlantic -0.1667 0.1149 9549 -1.45 0.1467 
East North Central -0.4117 0.1184 9549 -3.48 0.0005 
East South Central -0.51 0.1381 9549 -3.69 0.0002 
West North Central -0.3592 0.1409 9549 -2.55 0.0108 
West South Central -0.4774 0.1169 9549 -4.08 <.0001 
Mountain 0.01125 0.1388 9549 0.08 0.9354 
Pacific 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Case Mix Index (CMI) 0.3701 0.09899 9549 3.74 0.0002 
Note. Coefficients of zero due to redundancy are reported “n/a.” 
 
 Odds ratios calculated from the parameter estimates indicate that a 1% increase in DSH 
doubled the likelihood that a hospital would be penalized, and a 1-unit increase in CMI 
demonstrated a 50% increase in the likelihood of hospital penalty. For each 10-patient increase 
in average daily census, the odds of hospital penalty increased by 2%. In comparison to 
hospitals in the Pacific region, hospitals located in the East North and South Central, West 
North and South Central regions demonstrated a significantly lower probability of hospital 
penalty than all other regions. The East North Central region contains the states of Wisconsin, 
Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio; East South Central contains Kentucky, Tennessee, 
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Mississippi, and Alabama; West North Central contains North and South Dakota, Minnesota, 
Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri; West South Central includes Texas, Louisiana, 
Arkansas, and Oklahoma (US Census Bureau, 2000a). A map of regional categorizations can 
be found in Appendix D.  
Results for Secondary Objective 
 The secondary objective was to determine whether a hospital's penalization status across 
one or more HAC Reduction Program years was related to quality performance (Total HAC 
Score). Frequencies and proportions describing the relationship of penalty in any given program 
year with whether organizations had a reduction in Total HAC Score from 2015 to 2017 are 
described in in Table 9. To summarize, 49% of hospitals with no penalty in any year improved 
their Total HAC Score; 51% of hospitals with 1 year of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 
54% of hospitals with 2 years of penalty improved their Total HAC Score; 73% of hospitals with 
3 years of penalty improved their Total HAC Score.  
Table 9 
 
Frequencies and Proportions of the Effect of Penalty in Any Given Program Year on Whether 
Organizations Had a Reduction in Total HAC Score from 2015 to 2017 (n= 3204). 
 Total HAC Score 
Reduction: No 
Total HAC Score 
Reduction: Yes 
Total 
All Hospitals with 
Total HAC Score 
Reduction: Yes 
 n % n % n % 
0 Years of Penalty 959 61.8% 912 55.2% 1871 48.7% 
1 Year of Penalty 349 22.5% 361 21.8% 710 50.8% 
2 Years of Penalty 177 11.4% 205 12.4% 382 53.7% 
3 Years of Penalty  66 4.3% 175 10.6% 241 72.6% 
Subtotal for Total HAC 
Score Reduction Group  
1551 48.4% 1653 51.6% 3204 51.6% 
  
 One-way ANOVA testing (see Table 10 in Appendix) indicated there was a significant effect 
of hospital's penalization status on subsequent Total HAC scores (df= 3, F= 16.751, p= 0.000). 
Because it was of interest if differences existed between hospitals grouped by years of penalty 
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(0-3 years), the Tukey adjustment method for comparison between multiple groups was used for 
post-hoc testing. Significant differences were found between hospitals having 3 years of penalty 
and all other penalty year groups (all p= 0.000). The mean difference in the reduction of Total 
HAC Score between hospitals penalized in all 3 years and those not penalized at all was also 
significant in relation to other groups (diff= 0.239, p= 0.000). In addition, Total HAC Score 
reduction between hospitals receiving penalty 3 years and those receiving penalty 0, 1, and 2 
years of the years studied (each 3 pairs) demonstrated a significant relationship.  
 In summary, the analysis of the data resulted in numerous significant findings. For the 
primary objective, increased average daily census, DSH percentage, and CMI were all 
associated with significantly higher probability of penalty across years in the HAC Reduction 
Program. Regionally, hospitals located in Midwestern states as defined by the US Census 
Bureau (US Census Bureau, 2000b) were less likely to be penalized than hospitals located in 
other regions. While 49% of hospitals with no penalty improved their Total HAC Score, as years 
of penalty increased from 1-3 years, the percentage of hospitals that improved their HAC score 
within each group also increased. 
Discussion (Chapter V) 
The study found significant differences in some structural characteristics of hospitals 
penalized in the HAC Reduction program from program years FY 2015 to FY 2018. Further, a 
significant association was found between improvement in Total HAC Score for hospitals 
receiving penalty for 3 years and whether a hospital was penalized across program years 
(2015-2017). The significant relationship between certain structural characteristics and penalty 
were similar to results from other cross-sectional studies (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 
2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), with differences observed in some characteristics, possibly resulting 
from the execution of a longitudinal analysis. This relationship will be discussed further here.  
Structural Characteristics (Primary Objective) 
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The evaluation of various structural characteristics was key to achieving the primary 
objective. Though previous research indicates that hospital structural characteristics are 
associated with financial penalty in the HAC Reduction Program (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram 
et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018) and performance in the HAC Reduction Program and VBP 
(Borah et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015), this study 
examined the association between hospital structural characteristics and penalty status across 
program years (2015-2018). The study results indicated that increased average daily census, 
DSH percentage, and CMI demonstrated a statistically significant association with HAC 
Reduction Program penalty across years. Modest increases in DSH percentage and CMI 
demonstrated the most significant increase in the odds of a hospital receiving a penalty. Both 
DSH percentage and CMI are indicators of patient complexity, and this study’s results are 
consistent with findings from previous cross-sectional studies that found hospitals with high 
patient volume and procedures and those with a higher proportion of complex and/or 
disadvantaged populations are penalized more frequently (Rajaram et al., 2015). Therefore, risk 
adjustments currently used could be incomplete. It may be prudent for DSH percentage and 
CMI to be incorporated into risk adjustment in the HAC-reduction program and other value-
based reimbursement programs as some have suggested (Fuller et al., 2017). 
Region was found in this study to be significantly associated with penalty. Organizations 
located in the Midwestern region were less likely to be penalized in the HAC Reduction Program 
than hospitals located in other regions. One possible explanation could be that there are fewer 
academic medical centers in the Midwest. Academic medical centers have higher proportions of 
ICU patients and treat patients with more comorbidities (Burke et al., 2018) and, thus, higher 
CMI. With fewer Academic Medical Centers the Midwest regions also have fewer complex 
patients and therefore a reduced likelihood of HAC prevalence, and therefore penalty. In the 
Midwestern Census area, 71% are nonteaching hospitals compared to 68% in the Northeast, 
74% in the West, and 87% in the South (Burke et al., 2018). 
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Though HACs are often used as measurements of nursing care, process, and structure 
(American Nurses Association, n.d.; Burston et al., 2014), this study used one measure of 
nursing structure: ANCC Magnet accreditation status. Magnet status was selected for use in this 
study because of its association with reduced HAC incidence (Barnes et al., 2016; Bergquist-
Beringer et al., 2018). It was somewhat surprising that Magnet status, hospital ownership, and 
CBSA were not significant, and therefore, not retained in the final model. Hospitals who are 
Magnet accredited had been shown in previous research to have lower HAC incidence (Barnes 
et al., 2016; Bergquist-Beringer et al., 2018) and hospitals penalized more frequently have been 
shown to hold more quality accreditations, such as Joint Commission accreditation (Rajaram et 
al., 2015). Previous research has also indicated that penalized hospitals are more likely to be 
urban or voluntary non-profit owned (Soltoff et al., 2018). The nonsignificant results in this study 
for Magnet status, hospital ownership, and CBSA may be related to the use of a repeated 
measures ANCOVA model rather than the cross-sectional logistic regression used in previous 
studies, which better detects within-subject change over time and typically has higher statistical 
power than cross-sectional designs (Guo, Logan, Glueck, & Muller, 2013).  
Penalty Status and Total HAC Score (Secondary Objective) 
The findings suggest that hospitals with 3 years of penalty are more likely to have a 
reduction in Total HAC Score than hospitals with fewer years of penalty, and the majority of 
hospitals demonstrated a reduction in Total HAC Score regardless of the number of years of 
penalty. It is possible that public reporting of the HAC Reduction Program results has driven this 
reduction over time (James, 2012). Despite the inability of hospitals to avoid penalty while still 
reducing their Total HAC Score from 2015 to 2017, the vast majority (73%) of hospitals 
experiencing penalty in all 3 years did have improved Total HAC Scores. The remaining 27% of 
hospitals did not see improvement in Total HAC Score. Reduction in overall Total HAC Scores 
is a promising indicator that HAC rates are improving, regardless of penalty status. 
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Though the study results do not directly address concerns related to methodological 
reliability of the HAC Reduction Program, HAIs, or PSIs as mechanisms of measuring quality 
performance (Bysshe et al., 2017; Rau, 2016; Soltoff et al., 2018), the results do imply that the 
majority of hospitals are not being unfairly or repeatedly penalized despite improvement in their 
Total HAC Scores. The HAC Reduction Program bases the penalty threshold upon the 
performance of all eligible hospitals in a given program year, meaning that since hospitals are 
improving overall, the penalty threshold will change accordingly. To avoid penalty in the HAC 
Reduction Program, hospitals would need to improve at a faster pace than their peers. The 
minority of hospitals that do experience penalty may consider prioritizing the robust 
implementation of evidence-based HAC prevention practices, such as those offered by CMS, 
AHRQ, and CMS toolkits, to prevent sustained penalty in the HAC Reduction Program (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2016a; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2017b). In summary, the current study found that Total HAC Score is a valid measurement of 
quality improvement related to HAC incidence for the majority of hospitals, an assumption which 
has been reportedly controversial (Calderon et al., 2015; Fuller et al., 2017; Winters et al., 
2016). 
Study Limitations 
Limitations in this study include methodological changes and issues around missing data, 
hospital type, CMI, and Magnet status variables.  
Methodological changes. The most significant limitation of this study is that methodological 
changes across HAC Reduction Program years do not create the most robust methodological 
conditions for comparisons over time. Such methodological changes could precipitate 
measurement bias (Hulley et al., 2013). Nonetheless, statisticians contracted by CMS 
encourage the comparison of performance across years, with the exception of 2018 when the 
Winsorization scoring method was adopted (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2017b) since no hospital is uniquely subjected to the yearly methodological changes. The use of 
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a binary variable to indicate whether a reduction in Total HAC Score was achieved for hospitals 
between 2015 and 2017 was also suboptimal.  
A second methodological limitation is that, though using the Total HAC Score as a 
continuous dependent variable was considered, the raw value is not a clinically meaningful 
metric. Instead, it is a composite with a changing penalty threshold each year. The Total HAC 
Score does not translate directly to a rate or quantification of HAC incidence, rather, it is 
directionally indicative of improvement with decline (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, n.d.). Also, since penalty threshold varies from year to year, a Total HAC Score that 
indicates good performance relative to other hospitals in one year may result in penalty the next 
year if the penalty threshold is set differently for that year. Therefore, there is an opportunity for 
more robust and informative future analysis of the HAC Reduction Program that may examine 
Total HAC Score as a continuous outcome variable. For example, this might involve calculating 
the percent difference between years for all hospitals in relation to the respective benchmark for 
each program year. 
Missing data. Another limitation is that data for 178 hospitals were not available for analysis 
in the secondary objective. It was not feasible to calculate the difference in Total HAC Score 
and penalty status for those 178 hospitals in the current study, as those hospitals had missing 
Total HAC Scores or penalty status in one or more of the included years. Therefore, these 
hospitals may be included in the assignment of relative rank/performance decile used by CMS 
to calculate the penalty threshold in any given year (2015 through 2017), but were excluded 
from the one-way ANOVA in this study. Although secondary, retrospective analysis may pose 
methodological concerns associated with procedures used in the primary data collection and 
analysis: i.e. bias, representativeness, missing data from the primary source, and issues with 
data linkage (Clarke & Cossette, 2000; Harron et al., 2017), it is the only means of ascertaining 
CMS pay-for-performance program performance.  
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Hospital type. An important distinction for NHSN HAI surveillance criteria and value-based 
reimbursement programs as a whole is hospital type (American Hospital Association, 2014; 
Burke et al., 2018; Fernando, Gray, & Gottlieb, 2017; McIlvennan et al., 2015; Peasah, Mckay, 
Harman, Al-Amin, & Cook, 2013). Hospital type is whether the hospital is designated as acute 
care, children’s, or critical access by CMS; however, it is not stated explicitly in CMS guidelines 
that acute care hospitals are the only hospitals subject to payment penalty in the HAC 
Reduction Program. Instead, only exempted hospitals and units are described (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2018). Therefore, an alternative structural characteristic or 
variables, such as teaching status or trauma designation, would have been more meaningful 
alternatives for inclusion in this study. 
CMI. Variation in coding practices among hospitals included in the study may impact the 
interpretation of CMI’s effect on penalty status in general. Consistency in CMI versions across 
program years was not possible given that several years were studied. Slightly different results 
from the model could have been obtained for different CMI versions, which rely on the DRG 
grouper version in use during a given HAC Reduction Program year. This lack of consistency 
serves as an important reminder that CMI relies heavily upon coding used for billing and 
administrative purposes, and variation in coding does impact the appropriate capture of 
complications and comorbidities used to determine illness severity (Yang & Reinke, 2006). 
While CMI has been used in some similar studies as an indicator of patient complexity (Fuller et 
al., 2017; Rajaram et al., 2015), validity concerns with CMI are not addressed in those studies. 
Magnet status. Magnet accreditation status is publicly available, unlike many other nursing 
structural measures such as staffing level, nurse-to-patient ratios, training resources, or 
facilities; however, Magnet status may not be wholly reliable as a single measure of nursing 
structure. There is a strong body of literature establishing relationships between increased 
nurse staffing (B. Mitchell, Gardner, Stone, Hall, & Pogorzelska-Maziarz, 2018), good nurse 
work environments (Kelly, Kutney-Lee, Lake, & Aiken, 2013), and nurse specialty certifications 
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(Boyle, 2017) with reduced HAC rates. Magnet hospitals are also characteristically large, 
academic medical centers in urban locations (Friese, Xia, Ghaferi, Birkmeyer, & Banerjee, 
2015). Since Magnet status was not significant and eliminated from the model early in the 
analysis, additional, more specific measures of nursing structure may have yielded greater 
sensitivity to nursing care and subsequently different results. 
Implications for Future Research 
Implications for healthcare administration. The results from this study have potential 
applications for healthcare administration related to the scopes of safety culture, leadership, and 
the contribution of nursing care in HAC prevention, as leadership and culture play an integral 
role in successful organizational quality and safety improvement (Berwick, 2008; Kaplan, 
Provost, Froehle, & Margolis, 2012; Lanham, 2013; Lukas et al., 2007). Structural 
characteristics driving organizational change such as mission, vision, and strategy, operational 
functions and processes, and infrastructure are foundational in organizational safety culture 
(Lukas et al., 2007; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Leadership culture, teamwork, and a spirit of 
continuous organizational improvement are key elements of improving patient safety and quality 
metrics, including HACs. These elements overlap considerably with the dimensions of the 
AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, which has demonstrated overall acceptable 
psychometric properties as a measure of overall organizational safety culture (Sorra & Dyer, 
2010). Additionally, evidence has shown that higher scores on the AHRQ Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture are correlated with better patient outcomes (DiCuccio, 2015), including 
HACs (Reis, Paiva, & Sousa, 2018). 
The publicly available hospital characteristics such as those included in the current study 
allow for convenient and standardized quality assessment; however, many popular sources 
available free of cost do not capture organizationally-established measures of structure, 
process, and outcomes. Future research on this topic should investigate organizational 
leadership and safety culture in relation to HACs or leveraging mixed methods by integrating 
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qualitative surveys with publicly reported data, such as the AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture. 
Policy implications. The results from this study offer several implications to policy and 
factors to consider for future research, including the impact of the methodology and efficacy of 
value-based reimbursement program. First, this study emphasizes the importance and impact of 
controlling for hospital structural characteristics in data analyses used for the development of 
policy, such as the ACA, under which the HAC Reduction Program was legislated. Differences 
in methodological approaches are an important policy consideration when hospital performance 
is measured and simplified for public consumption (for example, Leapfrog Safety Scores or 
CMS Star Ratings) (James, 2012). Although the methodology used within programs is not 
legislated, public reporting is (James, 2012). Certain standards of validation and reliability 
should be considered to be mandated with the public reporting of hospital performance, as 
accuracy has been and remains a major concern for providers (James, 2012). 
The principles underpinning value-based reimbursement programs and policies, that penalty 
or reward will incentivize the improvement of quality and safety, has been wrought with 
controversy (American Hospital Association, 2014; Association of American Medical Colleges, 
2014; de Bruin et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; 
Mendelson et al., 2017; Van Herck et al., 2010; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2015). The current 
study does not precipitate any conclusions regarding the efficacy of pay-for-performance 
policies as a whole, but does indicate that penalties associated with the HAC Reduction 
Program may drive improvement in HACs across the board, regardless of penalty status. 
Additional research is needed to better understand policies and other mechanisms by which 
hospitals can be motivated to improve and sustain improved performance. 
Conclusion (Chapter V) 
 
This study explored hospital structural characteristics as related to both penalty status and 
HAC performance, across program years. Additionally, the study determined whether a 
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hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to 
HAC performance. The study found that, with increasing average daily census, DSH 
percentage, and CMI, hospitals were more likely to be penalized in the program. Regional 
differences were observed, with hospitals located geographically in the Midwest demonstrating 
less likelihood of receiving HAC Reduction Program penalty. This study’s results suggest that, 
despite the inability of some hospitals to meet the benchmark to avoid penalty, the majority of 
hospitals improved their Total HAC Score across the years studied. This finding suggests that 
hospitals are not being unfairly or repeatedly penalized despite improvement in their Total HAC 
Scores, potentially indicating an encouraging reduction of HAC incidence, or outcomes, across 
the country. 
Numerous implications of this research were identified in the areas of organizational 
administration and healthcare policy. An organization or hospital’s mission, vision, and strategy, 
as well as operational infrastructure can have a tremendous impact on the ability to improve 
quality and safety for patients. Though some pay-for-performance programs are mandated to 
measure quality, more care should be taken to ensure that ensure that metrics are 
methodologically sound and account for key structural characteristics such as DSH percentage 
and CMI, especially where performance is reported for public consumption. 
Given the numerous limitations of this study, accurate measurement of quality pertaining to 
healthcare delivery is paramount in ensuring that value-based reimbursement policies are 
meaningful to providers and patients. Measurement and instrumentation related to quality in 
healthcare and nursing are perhaps the most challenging aspects of achieving effective pay-for-
performance strategies: primary data sources are rarely available and secondary sources 
sometimes leave much to be desired. With regard to the foundational principles of value-based 
reimbursement, there is a substantial gap in the availability of reliable nursing-sensitive quality 
indicators; still, nursing care is the mainstay of our nation’s healthcare system. It is essential that 
we better understand the modalities by which positive change is facilitated and how such 
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change can be rewarded in order to reduce patient harm and improve the health and well-being 
of the population. 
Value-based reimbursement policy remains a promising area of research as healthcare and 
nursing experts strive to understand the how care quality can be measured and incentivized. 
Quality improvement, systems, organizational, and behavioral economics theories are the 
underlying framework for pay-for-performance, but inspire debate surrounding efficacy in 
improving patient outcomes for researchers, policy experts, providers, and organizations. 
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Appendices (Manuscript) 
Appendix A 
Variables, operational definitions, sources, and variable names for analysis. 
Variable 
 
Operational Definition Source 
Dataset 
Variable 
Name 
Independent Variables for Primary Objective (FY 2015-2018) 
Hospital type Hospital description as acute care, children’s, or critical access by 
CMS. 
Hospital Compare 
Hospital General 
Information file 
Hospital 
Type  
 
Case mix index Average DRG relative weight for each hospital, calculated by 
summing the DRG weights for all Medicare discharges and 
dividing by the number of discharges and paid under Hospital 
Specific Payment rate (Roth, 2017).  
CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
CMI 
Average Daily Census Average daily patient census. CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
Average 
Daily 
Census 
Bed Size Number of beds licensed to hospital. CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
BEDS 
Ownership Hospital ownership description: owned by government (federal, 
state, local, or hospital district or authority), physician, proprietary, 
tribal, voluntary non-profit (church, other, or private). 
Hospital Compare 
Hospital General 
Information file 
Hospital 
Ownership 
DSH Adjustment DSH Patient Percentage as determined from most recent update 
of the Provider Specific File & Social Security Administration Data 
(Roth, 2017). 
CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
DSHPCT 
Location 1. CMS Core Based Statistical Area designation 
categorized by CMS as urban or rural, large, or other.  
2. Region categorized as New England, Middle Atlantic, 
South Atlantic, East North Central, East South Central, 
West North Central, West South Central, Mountain, 
Pacific, or Puerto Rico. 
CMS Payment 
Update Impact 
File 
REGION, 
URGEO 
ANCC Magnet Status Yes/No, binary variable related to whether the hospital is 
accredited with Magnet status for each HAC Reduction Program 
year (2015-2018). 
ANCC n/a 
Dependent Variable for Primary Objective (FY 2015-2018) /  
Independent Variable for Secondary Objective (FY 2015-2017) 
HAC Reduction 
Program Status 
Yes/No, binary variable related to whether penalty was issued by 
CMS.  
Hospital Compare 
HAC Reduction 
Program file  
Payment_ 
Reduction 
Penalty in Any Other 
Program Year 
(Covariate) 
Yes/No covariate binary variable constructed to indicate whether a 
given hospital had been penalized in any other program year (if 
Payment_Reduction= ‘yes’ then Penalty_In_Other_Year= ‘1’). 
Calculated 
Penalty_In_
Other_Year 
Dependent Variable for Secondary Objective (FY 2015-2017) 
Total HAC Score Total HAC Score based on hospitals’ performance on 6 quality 
measures: PSI-90 and NHSN CLABSI, CAUTI, SSI for Colon 
Surgery and Abdominal Hysterectomy, MRSA bacteremia, and 
Clostridium difficile infection measures. Hospitals with a Total HAC 
Score greater than the 75th percentile of the Total HAC Score 
distribution are subject to a payment reduction (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). 
Hospital Compare 
HAC Reduction 
Program file 
Total_HAC
_Score 
 
Note. CMS = Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; CMI = Case Mix Index; DRG = diagnosis-related group; DSH = 
Disproportionate Share; ANCC = American Nurses Credentialing Center; HAC = Hospital Acquired Condition; PSI = Patient Safety 
Indicator; NHSN = National Health and Safety Network; CLABSI = Central line-associated bloodstream infection; CAUTI = Catheter-
associated urinary tract infection; SSI = Surgical site infection; MRSA = methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus. 
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Appendix B 
 
Data Analysis and Management Plan 
Each study objective requires a different analytical and data management approach. SAS 
software will be used for statistical tests in both objectives. Post hoc power analysis will not be 
necessary, as effect size was considered large due to the sample size (>100) in both objectives, 
and nonsignificant results indicating potential Type II error were not present (James Stevens, 
2002). 
Primary Objective 
For the primary objective, an analytical approach allowing for multiple independent variables 
(structural characteristics) and a single, binary dependent variable (penalty status) for each 
program year is necessary (Kim & Mallory, 2016). The approach must control for the covariate 
of penalty status in any other program year and allow for repeated measurement of independent 
and dependent variables for each program year studied (FY 2015-2018). Thus, a binary logistic 
regression with repeated measures ANCOVA will be used to test for a relationship between 
each hospital characteristic (independent variable) and HAC Reduction Program penalty status 
(dependent variable) for each program year (2015-2018). In order to assess the relationship 
between and across these variables and HAC Reduction Program penalty status, structural 
variables will be used in a univariate, then multivariate model. Descriptive statistics including 
calculating means, standard deviations, and ranges for the continuous variables, and counts 
with frequencies for categorical variables will be used to describe the characteristics of the 
sample. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference in the characteristics of 
hospitals penalized versus not penalized in the HAC Reduction program from program years FY 
2015 to FY 2018, which will be tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is an 
association among hospital characteristics across all program years. If the p-value is less than 
the assumed significance level of α = 0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the 
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alternative. Frequencies, proportions, and 95% confidence intervals will be used for each 
categorical group. Data will be assumed normal and homoscedasticity will be checked 
graphically. Multicollinearity will be addressed using backward elimination if any variable is 
found to have a significant effect on the outcome (penalty status).  
Secondary Objective 
The secondary objective requires an approach appropriate for evaluating the relationship 
between a single binary independent variable (hospital penalty status) and a continuous 
dependent variable (Total HAC Score) over time (program years FY 2015 to 2017) (Kim & 
Mallory, 2016). A general linear mixed model will be used for the secondary objective. 
Themodel statement will be modified to model categorical outcomes with fixed effects and 
repeated measures, using the SAS GLIMMIX procedure to account for repeated measurement 
of the independent and dependent variables for each program year (Schabenberger, 2005). 
Univariate testing will be performed for any variables determined to be confounding in the 
multivariate model. 
The null hypothesis for the secondary objective states there is no significant association 
between Total HAC Score and penalty status across program years (2015-2017), which will be 
tested against the alternative hypothesis that there is an association among hospital 
characteristics across years. If the p-value is less than the assumed significance level of α = 
0.05, our null hypothesis will be rejected in favor of the alternative. Data will be assumed normal 
and homoscedasticity will be checked graphically. 
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Appendix C 
Winsorization and Consistency in HAC Reduction Program Methodology 
Of note, for FY 2015 through 2017, Winsorization was not used for the calculation of the 
Total HAC Score. Instead, hospitals’ Total HAC Scores were determined points assigned by 
relative rank/performance decile only (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017d). 
This methodology is further described in Appendix B. Winsorization is a statistical procedure 
that involves ranking hospitals on a spectrum from best to worst performing and, “if a hospital’s 
measure result falls between the minimum and 5th percentile, CMS sets the hospital’s measure 
result equal to the 5th percentile”; “if a hospital’s measure result falls between the 95th 
percentile and maximum, CMS sets the hospital’s measure results equal to the 95th percentile” 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2017b). This process is performed to reduce the 
effects of extremely high or low measure results (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2017d). 
Although measure specification and definition changes within PSIs and HAIs across 
program years and therefore pose challenges with in consistent measurement of HAC 
performance over time, the methodology for the calculation of Total HAC Score remained 
consistent from program years 2015 to 2017. In light of this, the Total HAC Score was used to 
measure performance improvement or decline over program years for FY 2015 to FY 2017.  
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Appendix D 
 
Census Regions and Divisions of the United States Map (US Census Bureau, 2000b), 
identifying areas included in each category of the variable “region” for the primary objective. 
 
 
 
Note: Variables numbered: 1= New England; 2= Middle Atlantic; 3= South Atlantic; 4= East North Central; 5= East 
South Central; 6= West North Central; 7= West South Central; 8= Mountain; 9= Pacific; 40= Puerto Rico. 
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Tables (Manuscript) 
 
Table 2 
 
Pairwise Pearson Correlations for Non-categorical Variables 
 Penalty 
Status 
Average 
Daily 
Census 
Bed Size DSH % CMI Region 
Magnet 
Status 
Penalty Status 1 0.183 0.167 0.078 0.091 -0.028 0.074 
Average Daily Census 0.183 1 0.970 0.189 0.406 -0.111 0.379 
Bed Size 0.167 0.970 1 0.205 0.405 -0.084 0.356 
Disproportionate Share 
(DSH) Percentage 
0.078 0.189 0.205 1 -0.070 0.171 -0.045 
Case Mix Index (CMI) 0.091 0.406 0.405 -0.070 1 0.193 0.216 
Region -0.028 -0.111 -0.084 0.171 0.193 1 -0.087 
Magnet Status 0.074 0.379 0.356 -0.045 0.216 -0.087 1 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Hospitals Grouped as Not Penalized for each HAC Reduction Program Year Studied, 2015 to 2018.   
  Hospitals Not Penalized 
Hospital Characteristics 2015  2016  2017  2018  Total for All Years 
Average Daily Census (mean, SD) 96.85 121.62   100.16 121.93   90.03 118.48   103.74 134.37   97.69 124.33 
Bed size (mean, SD) 173.59 169.48   180.11 171.44   166.44 167.66   182.08 183.46   175.53 173.20 
DSH Percentage (mean, SD) 0.28 0.17   0.28 0.17   0.29 0.18   0.29 0.18   0.28 0.17 
Case Mix Index (CMI) (mean, SD) 1.50 0.35   1.54 0.34   1.52 0.39   1.58 0.41   1.53 0.37 
                              
CBSA (n, %)                             
     Large urban 982 38%   976 40%   924 37%   961 38%   3843 38% 
     Other urban 856 33%   825 33%   849 34%   890 35%   3420 34% 
     Rural 718 28%   663 27%   708 28%   636 25%   2725 27% 
     Not Available 2 0%   0 0%   18 1%   22 1%   42 0% 
Total 2558 100%   2464 100%   2499 100%   2509 100%   10030 100% 
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Hospital Ownership (n, %)                             
     Government (all) 426 17%   397 16%   413 17%   369 15%   1605 16% 
     Physician 54 2%   48 2%   52 2%   65 3%   219 2% 
     Proprietary 553 22%   543 22%   557 22%   543 22%   2196 22% 
     Tribal 3 0%   4 0%   4 0%   2 0%   13 0% 
     Voluntary (all) 1522 59%   1472 60%   1452 58%   1515 60%   5961 59% 
     Not Available 0 0%   0 0%   21 1%   15 1%   36 0% 
Total 2558 100%   2464 100%   2499 100%   2509 100%   10030 100% 
                              
Hospital Type (n, %)                             
     Acute Care 2558 100%   2464 100%   2499 100%   2509 100%   10030 100% 
                              
Magnet Status (n, %)                             
     Accredited 215 8%   218 9%   224 9%   267 11%   924 9% 
     Not Accredited 2276 89%   2215 90%   2248 90%   2242 89%   8981 90% 
     Not Available 67 3%   31 1%   27 1%   0 0%   125 1% 
Total 2558 100%   2464 100%   2499 100%   2509 100%   10030 100% 
                              
Region (n, %)                             
     New England 96 4%   85 3%   92 4%   99 4%   372 4% 
     Middle Atlantic 267 10%   258 10%   236 9%   254 10%   1015 10% 
     South Atlantic 434 17%   434 18%   387 15%   381 15%   1636 16% 
     East North Central 397 16%   391 16%   400 16%   410 16%   1598 16% 
     East South Central 254 10%   253 10%   255 10%   227 9%   989 10% 
     West North Central 206 8%   194 8%   221 9%   220 9%   841 8% 
     West South Central  452 18%   411 17%   428 17%   424 17%   1715 17% 
     Mountain 159 6%   161 7%   184 7%   179 7%   683 7% 
     Pacific 291 11%   277 11%   278 11%   293 12%   1139 11% 
     Not Available 2 0%   0 0%   18 1%   22 1%   42 0% 
Total 2558 100%   2464 100%   2499 100%   2509 100%   10030 100% 
                              
Note. DSH= Disproportionate Share; CBSA= CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)               
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Table 4                             
Descriptive Statistics for Hospitals Grouped as Penalized for each HAC Reduction Program Year Studied, 2015 to 2018.  
  Hospitals Penalized 
Hospital Characteristics 2015  2016  2017  2018  Total for All Years 
Average Daily Census (mean, SD) 168.01 170.90   158.88 177.52   172.79 173.59   132.96 156.75   158.16 170.49 
Bed size (mean, SD) 263.82 222.56   251.38 226.07   269.06 225.05   215.41 203.12   249.91 220.30 
DSH Percentage (mean, SD) 0.31 0.19   0.31 0.19   0.32 0.20   0.33 0.20   0.32 0.19 
Case Mix Index (CMI) (mean, SD) 1.63 0.34   1.63 0.37   1.63 0.38   1.58 0.39   1.62 0.37 
                              
CBSA (n, %)                             
     Large urban 357 49%   353 47%   391 51%   333 44%   1434 48% 
     Other urban 254 35%   264 35%   263 34%   242 32%   1023 34% 
     Rural 111 15%   128 17%   104 14%   161 21%   504 17% 
     Not Available 0 0%   2 0%   10 1%   13 2%   25 1% 
Total 722 100%   747 100%   768 100%   749 100%   2986 100% 
                              
Hospital Ownership (n, %)                             
     Government (all) 139 19%   120 17%   111 15%   143 20%   513 71% 
     Physician 6 1%   9 1%   13 2%   8 1%   36 1% 
     Proprietary 126 17%   126 17%   136 18%   159 21%   547 18% 
     Tribal 0 0%   0 0%   1 0%   3 0%   4 0% 
     Voluntary non-profit (all) 449 62%   492 66%   502 65%   436 58%   1879 63% 
     Not Available 2 0%   0 0%   5 1%   0 0%   7 0% 
Total 722 100%   747 100%   768 100%   749 100%   2986 100% 
Hospital Type (n, %)                             
     Acute Care 722 100%   747 100%   768 100%   749 100%   2986 100% 
                              
Magnet Status (n, %)                             
     Accredited 96 13%   114 15%   135 18%   89 12%   434 15% 
     Not Accredited 606 84%   623 83%   626 82%   660 88%   2515 84% 
     Not Available 20 3%   10 1%   7 1%   0 0%   37 1% 
Total 722 100%   747 100%   768 100%   749 100%   2986 100% 
                              
Region (n, %)                             
HAC REDUCTION PROGRAM    66                                                                                                                                                
  Emily Cochran 
    V00274575 
     New England 39 5%   49 7%   42 5%   34 5%   164 5% 
     Middle Atlantic 102 14%   105 14%   129 17%   109 15%   445 15% 
     South Atlantic 124 17%   123 16%   136 18%   140 19%   523 18% 
     East North Central 101 14%   99 13%   95 12%   88 12%   383 13% 
     East South Central 47 7%   40 5%   44 6%   71 9%   202 7% 
     West North Central 56 8%   59 8%   41 5%   39 5%   195 7% 
     West South Central  73 10%   90 12%   102 13%   97 13%   362 12% 
     Mountain 73 10%   63 8%   50 7%   52 7%   238 8% 
     Pacific 107 15%   117 16%   119 15%   106 14%   449 15% 
     Not Available 0 0%   2 0%   10 1%   13 2%   25 1% 
Total 722 100%   747 100%   768 100%   749 100%   2986 100% 
                              
Note. DSH= Disproportionate Share; CBSA= CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA)               
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Table 5 
 
Fixed Effects Model of Impact on Hospital Penalty Status, Eliminating Hospital Type and Bed Size 
Effect Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
Average Daily Census 1 9492 53.01 <.0001 
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage 1 9492 12.12 0.0005 
Hospital Ownership 9 9492 1.63 0.1002 
Region 8 9492 6.55 <.0001 
Case Mix Index 1 9492 13.96 0.0002 
CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) 2 9492 3.42 0.0327 
Magnet Status 1 9492 0.36 0.5461 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Fixed Effects Model of Impact on Hospital Penalty Status, Eliminating Hospital Type, Magnet Status, 
and Hospital Ownership 
Effect Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
Average Daily Census 1 9547 77.39 <.0001 
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage 1 9547 15.61 <.0001 
Region 8 9547 6.91 <.0001 
Case Mix Index (CMI) 1 9547 9.32 0.0023 
CMS Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) 2 9547 2.69 0.0681 
 
 
 
Table 7 
 
Fixed Effects Model of Impact on Hospital Penalty Status, Eliminating Hospital Type, Magnet Status, 
Hospital Ownership, and CBSA 
Effect Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F 
Average Daily Census 1 9549 88.56 <.0001 
Disproportionate Share (DSH) Percentage 1 9549 15.82 <.0001 
Region 8 9549 7.98 <.0001 
Case Mix Index (CMI) 1 9549 13.98 0.0002 
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Table 10 
 
Tukey Post Hoc Test Comparing Multiple Groups of Number of Years of Penalty within the Secondary 
Objective 
Group 1: # 
Years of 
Penalty 
Group 2: # 
Years of 
Penalty 
Mean 
Difference  
(Years of 
Penalty) 
Std. Error p 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
0 
1 -0.021 0.022 0.772 -0.08 0.04 
2 -0.049 0.028 0.290 -0.12 0.02 
3 -.239* 0.034 0.000 -0.33 -0.15 
1 
0 0.021 0.022 0.772 -0.04 0.08 
2 -0.028 0.031 0.807 -0.11 0.05 
3 -.218* 0.037 0.000 -0.31 -0.12 
2 
0 0.049 0.028 0.290 -0.02 0.12 
1 0.028 0.031 0.807 -0.05 0.11 
3 -.189* 0.041 0.000 -0.29 -0.08 
3 
0 .239* 0.034 0.000 0.15 0.33 
1 .218* 0.037 0.000 0.12 0.31 
2 .189* 0.041 0.000 0.08 0.29 
Note. *The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Chapter VI: Concluding Narrative 
The design of the study described in this dissertation was selected based on existing 
research related to this topic, guided also by philosophical and theoretical underpinnings related 
to value-based reimbursement. The process of identifying gap in existing literature, selecting a 
conceptual model, and developing a grant proposal and manuscript are further described here 
in a concluding narrative. 
Gap in Existing Literature 
There is a strong body of evidence indicating that additional research is necessary to fully 
explore the effects of pay-for-performance on the quality of care delivered (de Bruin et al., 2011; 
Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Emmert et al., 2012; Kondo et al., 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; 
Ogundeji et al., 2016; Tao, Agerholm, & Burström, 2016; Van Herck et al., 2010). Pay-for 
performance programs developed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
and commercial payors have been developed to incentivize quality and safety performance for 
hospitals and providers, but whether these programs achieve their intent is debated. One meta-
analysis and systematic review found the benefits of pay-for-performance programs to be 
“modest” to quality improvement and focused disproportionately on process measures instead 
of outcomes (Chee, Ryan, Wasfy, & Borden, 2016; Ogundeji et al., 2016). Another study found 
penalties for hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) are attributed to chance alone, given poor 
reliability of statistical procedures within the related CMS program (Koenig et al., 2016). 
Behavioral economists and social psychologists suggest that monetary incentives actually 
“undermine motivation and worsen performance on complex cognitive tasks” such as those in 
healthcare, in which intrinsic motivation is high (Himmelstein, Ariely, & Woolhandler, 2014b, p. 
203). 
Organizational structural characteristics play an important role in how facilities fare in quality 
performance programs and value-based reimbursement (Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 
2015). Experts in the area of pay-for-performance argue that these incentive or penalty models 
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should be carefully piloted in and evaluated in various organizational settings before adoption in 
order to maximize payment without diminishing providers’ intrinsic or altruistic motivations to 
care for patients (Conrad, 2015).  
Although previous research has shown hospital characteristics are related to being 
penalized by various CMS pay-for-performance programs within a single program year (Borah 
et al., 2012; Fuller et al., 2017; Koenig et al., 2016; Rajaram et al., 2015; Soltoff et al., 2018), 
there has been no exploration on how hospitals fare programs year-to-year. By characterizing 
the effects of the HAC Reduction program over time, the results of this study may inform 
decisions by healthcare policy stakeholders, such as the general public, policy makers, and 
technical experts who serve as advisors to CMS and AHRQ. This study was designed to 
address the gap in knowledge related to the efficacy of value-based reimbursement as a means 
of motivating providers and organizations to improve healthcare quality. 
Conceptual Model Selection 
 The conceptual model for this study was chosen based on positivist and mid-range theories, 
drawing from both need for empirical validation of health policy phenomena (Crotty, 1998) and 
the need to classify performance at the organization level based on care delivered at the patient 
level (Liehr & Smith, 2016). Such supporting theories include agency theory, value theory, and 
behavioral economics. 
 The conceptual model offering the most alignment with underlying theories is Donabedian’s 
Model of Healthcare Quality Improvement, which involves a three-pronged approach to 
assessing quality of care: evaluation of structure, process, and outcome (Donabedian, 1988). 
Structure accounts for the care setting; process considers the actual steps in care 
administration; outcome takes into account the effects of the care delivered on overall health 
status (Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian introduced that valuation be considered in quality 
improvement. He suggested that practitioners maximize the cost-benefit of healthcare 
improvements, as increased cost will not always lead to an equal increase in quality of care 
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(Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian’s theory can be related to almost any aspect of quality 
improvement research, particularly the efficacy of pay-for performance programs, as related 
quality metrics very frequently measure outcomes and value (which according to Donabedian, is 
the summation of structure and process in an organization).  
 Other frameworks were considered by the student, such as the quality health outcomes 
model, which is based upon Donabedian’s work and suggests indicators can be dynamic and 
interact upon one another in a reciprocal fashion (P. H. Mitchell, Ferketich, & Jennings, 1998). 
This model was not used because the research question focused on structure and outcome 
only. The Model for Understanding Success in Quality (MUSIQ) is a model developed by a 
panel of quality improvement experts that delineates key factors that influence the success of 
quality improvement projects and related contextual factors from the micro to macrosystem level 
(Kaplan et al., 2012). The MUSIQ could potentially be leveraged for future applications in the 
student’s program of research because it accounts for interactions and relationships between 
the organization, quality improvement team, microsystem (departments or units), and culture of 
leadership, staff, and project sponsors (Kaplan et al., 2012). 
Proposal and Manuscript 
 A grant proposal and manuscript were developed to explain the study design and report the 
findings for this dissertation. Using existing research, the study examined the relationship 
between hospital structural characteristics and penalization status (penalized or not penalized) 
in any given hospital acquired condition (HAC) Reduction Program year, FY 2015 through 2018 
and to determine whether a hospital's penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction 
Program years is related to quality performance (Total HAC Score) in subsequent years. A grant 
proposal, which serves as Chapters I-III of the dissertation, was written to explore this topic 
through retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using multiple publicly 
available data sources. 
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 The manuscript serves as Chapters IV-V and was written for submission to Quality 
Management in Healthcare, which has published over 65 articles related to pay-for-
performance, including some in relation specifically to nursing implications. Articles accepted by 
Quality Management in Healthcare are focused on “organizational structure and processes as 
these affect the quality of care and patient outcomes” (Quality Management in Healthcare, 
2019) . Content must build knowledge about the statistical tools used in the evaluation of care 
and patient outcomes, evaluate strategies designed to substantiate quantifiable quality 
improvements, facilitate collaboration between providers and payors or regulators in pursuit of 
improved patient outcomes, and explore links among the administrative and managerial aspects 
of patient care and organizational quality governance (Quality Management in Healthcare, 
2019). This study is aligned with these objectives because it evaluates the relationship between 
hospital structure and patient outcomes in a program initiated by an entity which is both a payor 
and regulator. 
 The manuscript details the methods, findings and discussion for the work proposed in 
Chapters I-III. The study explored hospital structural characteristics related to both penalty 
status and HAC performance, across program years. In addition, whether a hospital's 
penalization status across one or more HAC Reduction Program years is related to HAC 
performance was studied. The study found that with increasing average daily census, DSH 
percentage, and CMI, hospitals were more likely to be penalized in the program. Regional 
differences were observed, with hospitals located geographically in the Midwest demonstrating 
less likelihood of receiving HAC Reduction Program penalty. The majority of hospitals improved 
their Total HAC Score across the years studied, which is indicative of a potential downward 
trend in HAC incidence across the country. 
Implications 
Several implications for healthcare administration and healthcare policy were identified in 
this study. With regard to healthcare administration, an organization’s infrastructure, including 
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the structural characteristics included in this study, can have a substantial impact on the ability 
of an organization to improve quality and safety for patients. Structural characteristics can also 
include mission, vision, and strategy, operational functions and processes. Leadership culture, 
teamwork, and a spirit of continuous organizational improvement are key elements of improving 
patient safety and quality metrics, including HACs. Because the ability of an organization to 
improve is multifaceted, future research could study leadership and safety culture in relation to 
HACs or leveraging mixed methods by integrating qualitative surveys with publicly reported 
data. 
Another implication, related to healthcare policy, is that this study underscores the 
significance of controlling for hospital structural characteristics in data analyses used for the 
development of healthcare policies, such as the Affordable Care Act, under which the HAC 
Reduction Program and public quality reporting were legislated. The principles underpinning 
value-based reimbursement programs and policies and public reporting of quality data have 
been controversial. The methodology used in value-based programs and in public reporting 
should be very robust, and legislation should insist upon the utmost accuracy and integrity of 
publicly reported quality data. That said, it is possible that public reporting of HAC data could be 
responsible for the overall decline in HACs observed across program years in this study. 
Conclusion 
 The use of value-based reimbursement programs as a method of motivating providers and 
organizations to improve healthcare quality provided an opportunity for additional research, 
particularly related to how organizations fare programs like the HAC Reduction Program over 
time. A grant proposal was written to serve as Chapters I-III of the student’s dissertation, using 
Donabedian’s structure, process, and outcome as the guiding conceptual model. The model 
selection was informed by value theory, agency theory, and behavioral economics. The study 
was designed was a retrospective, longitudinal, multivariate regression analysis using 
secondary, public data sources. The proposal required some minor adjustments during the 
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analysis, which are detailed with the results of the study in the manuscript serving as Chapters 
IV-V. Ultimately, the study found that most hospitals improved their Total HAC Score across the 
years studied, regardless of penalty status. This indicates that the HAC Reduction Program, 
though perhaps indirectly through public reporting, may be reducing HAC incidence. Because 
several characteristics (average daily census, DSH percentage, and CMI) were significantly 
associated with penalty, policy makers should consider enhancing risk adjustment methods in 
the HAC Reduction Program to adjust for hospital structural characteristics such as these, which 
represent the acuity and complexity of patients. 
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